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Abstract
The traditional axiomatic approach to voting is motivated by the problem of reconciling differences
in subjective preferences. In contrast, a dominant line of work in the theory of voting over the past
15 years has considered a different kind of scenario, also fundamental to voting, in which there is a
genuinely “best” outcome that voters would agree on if they only had enough information. This type
of scenario has its roots in the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem; it includes cases such as jurors in a
criminal trial who all want to reach the correct verdict but disagree in their inferences from the available
evidence, or a corporate board of directors who all want to improve the company’s revenue, but who
have different information that favors different options.
This style of voting leads to a natural set of questions: each voter has a private signal that provides
probabilistic information about which option is best, and a central question is whether a simple plurality
voting system, which tabulates votes for different options, can cause the group decision to arrive at the
correct option. We show that plurality voting is powerful enough to achieve this: there is a way for
voters to map their signals into votes for options in such a way that — with sufficiently many voters —
the correct option receives the greatest number of votes with high probability. We show further, however,
that any process for achieving this is inherently expensive in the number of voters it requires: succeeding
in identifying the correct option with probability at least 1− η requires Ω(n3ǫ−2 log η−1) voters, where
n is the number of options and ǫ is a distributional measure of the minimum difference between the
options.
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1 Introduction
Information-Based Voting. A dominant recent theme in the study of voting has been to trace differences
in voters’ preferences back to differences in the information they have about the world. This information-
based approach has its roots in one of the earliest results in voting theory — the Condorcet Jury Theorem,
which used the then-young theory of probability to model a situation in which a panel of jurors each wants
to vote for the correct decision in a trial, but each juror may be wrong about what the correct decision is
independently and with probability p < 12 [17]. It is only very recently, however, that this approach has
received deeper theoretical attention [2, 4, 6, 7, 16], leading to what is now a large and growing body of
research.
The basic premise of the information-based approach to voting is that all voters want the best option
for the group as a whole, but they disagree on what this best option is, based on the information they have.
This models a wide range of situations where the differences among voters are not purely subjective, but
instead based on uncertainty. For example, in most criminal trials the key question is genuinely whether
the defendant committed the crime or not; all jurors want to reach the correct decision, but they disagree on
which of the pieces of information presented at the trial are most salient. Similarly, all the members of a
corporate board of directors may genuinely agree that the goal is to reach a decision that will most improve
the company’s future revenue, but they disagree on which course of action is most likely to achieve this.
Even at the level of large populations, there can be cases where each voter wants a candidate whose election
— for example — will lead to the strongest improvement in the economy, but there is disagreement among
the voters about which candidate is most likely to achieve this.
This view of voters as information-processing agents trying to reach a correct decision has made it
possible to develop models for a range of important phenomena in voting; these include the fact that voters
realize they might be wrong, and the corollary that they can sometimes be convinced by evidence [2, 7], the
corresponding role of deliberation in committee voting [10], and the fact that many voters may choose to
abstain or not participate when they believe that others have more accurate information than they do [3, 8].
A Basic Model of Information-Based Voting. In this paper, we consider the following basic theoreti-
cal model that has received wide study [2, 7]. There is a decision to be made, involving selecting from
among several possible options A1, . . . , An. One of these options is correct, and all voters want to select
it. However, which option is correct is determined by a process that cannot be directly observed, and the
voters have to use indirect signals to infer the correct option. Before casting a vote, each voter t receives
a private signal equal to some value sj , providing evidence for the identity of the correct option. (The
full set of possible signals will be labeled {s1, s2, . . . , sC}.) We assume that certain kinds of signals are
more plentiful when certain options are correct, and that voters know conditional probabilities of the form
Pr [sj is received | Ai is correct] = ρij. We further assume that no two options induce exactly the same
set of conditional probabilities over signals. Based on the signal she receives, each voter casts a vote for
one option, potentially using a randomized rule to map the signal to a vote. A voting system — a rule for
mapping a collection of votes to a group decision — is then applied to these votes. We are interested in the
probability that the group decision will be equal to the correct option Ai.
Much of the power of this model in economics and political science comes from the way in which it sep-
arates the signals received by the voters from the options they are voting on. This captures a basic property
of voting in many real-life situation, including the ones described at the outset: the signals represent infor-
mation and decision-making heuristics that the individual voters possess in their minds, while the options
correspond to candidates or alternatives presented on a ballot. For many reasons, the institution of voting
therefore does not (and generally cannot) consist of a simple sharing of everyone’s signals. Instead, voters
are only able to convey the information they possess in a more indirect fashion, by voting for one of the
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given options. The crucial question is whether there is a (possibly randomized) algorithm each voter can
apply to his or her signal to produce a vote, in such a way that the correct option is chosen.
For simplicity in the following discussion, we consider an equivalent formulation of this model (in the
spirit of [1]), via an experiment involving urns and marbles. Suppose an experimenter has a collection of
urns A1, . . . , An, and each urn contains marbles of colors s1, . . . , sC . The fraction of marbles of color sj
in urn Ai is equal to ρij ; no two urns have exactly the same mixture of colors. Now, the experimenter
announces to a set of test subjects that he is placing one of the urns A1, . . . , An on a table. Each test subject
draws and replaces a single marble from the urn on the table, without showing it to the other subjects, and
then writes down a vote (on a secret ballot) for which urn she believes is on the table. The experimenter
then applies a voting rule to these votes, producing a group decision, and awards the group a prize if this
group decision is equal to the true urn that was on the table. It should be clear that this formulation is simply
a rephrasing of the original model, with the urns representing the options and the marbles representing the
signals.
Can Plurality Voting Produce the Correct Answer?. Much of the initial theoretical work on these issues
focused on the case of n = 2 options — that is, voting when there are two alternatives, such as in a jury trial
or a yes/no vote on a proposed rule [2, 4, 6, 7, 16]. But many settings involve more than two options, and
in this case the following basic question has remained open. Suppose the votes will be aggregated simply
using plurality voting, with the urn receiving the most votes chosen as the group decision. Is there a rule
the voters can use for mapping signals (colors) to votes, such that for any instance of the problem with urns
A1, . . . , An, a set of m voters will identify the correct urn with probability converging to 1 as m grows?
And if so, how large a set of voters is needed to guarantee a success probability of 1− η, for a given η > 0?
Recent work has highlighted the challenge and general lack of understanding of this question with
more than two options, raising it as an open problem and providing interesting results in highly structured
special cases where the signal space is rich enough that each option has a disjoint set of one or more signals
that uniquely favor it [12, 13]. For general sets of signals, the question has been open: if the signals are
expressively weak compared to the full set of options, is there necessarily any strategy for mapping signals
to votes that would lead to the correct outcome under a simple system like plurality voting?
Optimal Information-Based Voting: Main Results. Our first main result is that for any finite set of
signals, and any finite set of options that induce distinct distributions over these signals, there is a strategy
such that a sufficiently large set of voters can arrive at the correct option with high probability using plurality
voting. In other words, each voter translates her signal into a vote in such a way that the option receiving
the most votes is, with high probability, the correct one.
Second, we show that achieving this goal using plurality voting is very expensive: it requires a large
number of voters. We give lower and upper bounds on the number of voters needed to achieve a high
probability of correctness, parametrized by three quantities: the number of options, the number of signals,
and a quantity measuring the minimum separation between the distributions over signals induced by any
two options. The lower bound is the technically most involved of our results, and for two signals it is
asymptotically tight in both the number of options and the separation parameter.
The technical core of our results is the case in which there are n options and 2 signals. Let ǫ be the
minimum positive difference between the probability assigned to a fixed signal sk by two different options
i and j. With two signals, we show there is a strategy by which O(n3ǫ−2 log η−1) voters can arrive at the
correct option using plurality voting with probability at least 1 − η. The strategy is symmetric, in that all
voters map signals to votes according to the same probabilistic rule. While the algorithm involves a carefully
designed rule, it is based on a principle that is intuitively natural: the voters “hedge” against the possibility
that their information points in the wrong direction, by sometimes choosing to vote for an option other than
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the one supported by their signal. The bound achieved by our algorithm is tight: there are instances in
which Ω(n3ǫ−2 log η−1) voters are necessary to achieve such a guarantee; this lower bound applies even to
asymmetric strategies in which different voters can use different rules.
Note that by the pigeonhole principle, the minimum difference ǫ is at most 1/(n−1), and hence ǫ−1 is a
parameter that is at least as large as n−1. For example, the special case with urns A0, A1, . . . , An, in which
Ai contains i blue marbles and n − i red marbles, has ǫ = 1/n, and so for this problem the tight bound on
the minimum number of voters needed is Θ(n5 log η−1).
A recurring theme in our results is this fifth-power dependence of the number of voters on n, in the case
when ǫ−1 is close to n. As such, it is useful to provide some intuition at the outset for how this fifth-power
dependence arises. Thus, the following description is deliberately informal, but gives a sense for where
this functional form comes from. Let there be m voters, and for simplicity let us consider the special case
from the previous paragraph, with urns A0, A1, . . . , An, in which Ai contains i blue marbles and n − i
red marbles. Under the asymptotically optimal (randomized) algorithms we consider, the correct urn will
receive a greater number of votes in expectation than any other urn; this is why, with enough voters, we will
eventually be able to distinguish the correct urn using plurality voting. Now, we will find that the optimal
algorithm has the following two properties. First, it spreads out the votes relatively uniformly across a set of
Θ(n) urns, and so if there are m voters, each of the urns in this set receives Θ(m/n) votes in expectation.
The second, subtler property is the crucial one: the optimal algorithm ensures that the correct urn receives
the most votes in expectation using a delicate optimization under which the the expected number of votes
received by the correct urn will exceed the expected number of votes received by the adjacent urns by a
factor of only 1+ δ, where δ = Θ(n−2). As a result, to distinguish the correct urn with high probability, we
need a number of samples that is sufficient to yield at least Θ(δ−2) = Θ(n4) votes for the correct urn. But
since the correct urn receives only Θ(m/n) votes in expectation, this means that we need m to be Θ(n5).
We observe that in our more general bound O(n3ǫ−2 log η−1), the form of the dependence on ǫ−1 is in
fact necessary even if the voters could share their signals (rather than casting individual votes). Indeed, with
n = 2 options that assign probabilities to signals differing by only ǫ, even a single observer would need
to see Θ(ǫ−2 log η−1) signals in order to identify the correct option with probability at least 1 − η. Thus,
with a constant number of options, plurality voting is allowing voters to aggregate their information with an
efficiency that is within a constant factor of the efficiency achievable by a single person who could observe
all signals directly.
For the case of C > 2 possible signals or colors, let ǫ denote the minimum ℓ1 distance1 of two distinct
urns’ probability distributions. We have an upper bound of O
(
(C logC)2n3ǫ−2 log nη
)
on the number of
voters needed. Since the lower bound for the two-signal case applies with C > 2, it is tight in ǫ, and we lose
only an exponentially small factor in n. Finding the correct dependence of the required number of voters on
n and C is an interesting open question.
Under plurality voting, voters can only communicate the name of a single option in response to a signal.
We also consider voting systems that allow voters to be much more expressive: cumulative voting, in which
each vote consists of assigning a non-negative weight to each option (such that the weights sum to 1); and
Condorcet voting, in which each vote consists of a ranking of all the options. For bichromatic urns, we
show that cumulative voting requires only O(ǫ−2 log η−1) voters in order to succeed with high probability;
this is tight even compared to the baseline discussed above, when a single observer has access to all the
signals. We show that a similar bound would hold for Condorcet voting, modulo an intriguing conjecture
about distributions over permutations.
1We observe that, in the multicolor case, choosing the right parameter to define a notion of “distance” between urns is not as
straightforward as in the bichromatic case. We chose ℓ1 because it is the parameter that has been used in the literature to determine
the minimum number of samples that allows an algorithm to distinguish between probability distributions.
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Optimal Information-Based Voting: Main Techniques. The possibility result for identifying the correct
option is based on a technique that implicitly draws a connection to the framework of proper scoring rules
from statistics [11]. Proper scoring rules can be thought of as incentive systems for eliciting accurate proba-
bilistic forecasts from expert predictors; the contexts in which they have been used in earlier work are quite
different from ours, and to our knowledge there have not been previous linkages between proper scoring
rules and information-based voting.
A construction based on proper scoring rules provides the first method for obtaining the correct option
using plurality voting. However, we need to go beyond this construction in order to obtain a tight bound
on the number of voters needed: in a sense to be made precise below, we can prove that any direct use of
proper scoring rules in our setting requires at least Ω(nǫ−4) voters to achieve a high probability of success.
This is at least Ω(n3ǫ−2) since ǫ ≤ (n − 1)−1, and more significantly, it has an asymptotically sub-optimal
dependence on ǫ of Ω(ǫ−4) when n is a constant, whereas our stronger approach achieves the optimal
dependence of Θ(ǫ−2 log η−1) for constant n.
For the lower bound, we need to show that with O(n3ǫ−2 log η−1) voters, there is a probability η that
plurality voting will choose the wrong option. For this, we identify a natural “close competitor” j of the
correct option i, with a very similar signal distribution, and we consider a random variable that measures the
extent to which the number of votes for the correct option i exceed the number for this competitor j. The
(possibly asymmetric) strategies of the voters determine the variance of this random variable, and roughly
speaking we follow a two-pronged argument in terms of this variance. If this variance is too low, then there
is a high chance that voters would behave the same regardless of whether the option generating the signals
was i or j, and hence that if they are correct about i with high probability, then they would have to be wrong
with constant probability when j is the correct option. If the variance is above a certain low threshold, on
the other hand, then we apply a carefully tuned “anti-concentration” inequality from [9, 14] showing that
there is a constant probability that the number of votes for i will drop below the number for its competitor j.
Further Related Work. Finally, we mention two other recent lines of work that have also considered
the problem faced by a set of agents trying to agree on a joint decision from a set of alternatives. Mossel,
Sly, and Tamuz study a version of the problem in which there are two options, and each agent is given a
probabilistic signal providing information about which option is correct [15]; in contrast to our approach and
to the work on voting discussed above, they consider a model in which agents may communicate iteratively
over multiple rounds. Caragiannis and Procaccia consider a setting based on agents that possess utilities
over options; within this framework, they show that simple voting rules can approximately optimize the sum
of agents’ utilities for the option that is selected [5].
2 An Upper Bound with Two Signals
We begin by considering the case of two signals. Suppose we have a collection of n urns, labeled p1, . . . , pn,
the i-th of which having a pi fraction of blue balls and a 1−pi fraction of red balls, with p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn.
We let ǫ denote the smallest difference between two consecutive pi’s: ǫ = min0≤i≤n−1 (pi+1 − pi) .
We assume that one urn is adversarially chosen as the correct one (we will also refer to this as the
unknown urn). Then each player draws a ball from the urn and votes for the name of an urn based on the
color they observe.
We describe the strategy that the players will use to randomly choose which vote to cast:
1. Let bk =
k−1∑
ℓ=1
2− (pℓ+1 + pℓ)
pℓ+1 − pℓ and rk =
n−1∑
ℓ=k
pℓ+1 + pℓ
pℓ+1 − pℓ . Then defineR =
∑n
k=1 rk andB =
∑n
k=1 bk,
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and set M = max(R,B).
2. The probability that a voter will vote for pj if a red ball is drawn is Rj = M−1 ·
(
rj +
M−R
n
)
.
3. The probability that a voter will vote for pj if a blue ball is drawn is Bj = M−1 ·
(
bj +
M−B
n
)
.
It is easy to check that the two given distribution are indeed probability distributions (their values are
non-negative and they both sum up to one). Now, the probability that a player will vote for pj given that the
correct, adversarially chosen, distribution is pi, is
Pr
X∼(pi,1−pi)
P∼f(X)
[P = pj] = pi Pr
P∼f(blue)
[P = pj ] + (1− pi) Pr
P∼f(red)
[P = pj] = piBj + (1− pi)Rj = Ei(j).
Now consider two urns, pi and pj . We compute the difference between the probabilities that a vote for
urn pi and a vote for urn pj are cast, given that the correct urn is pi:
∆i(j) = Ei(i) − Ei(j) = pi (Bi −Bj) + (1− pi) (Ri −Rj) .
We will lower-bound ∆i(j) to bound the number of voters needed to let the voting scheme be successful
with high probability. Suppose first that j < i; then
M ·∆i(j) = pi ·
i−1∑
ℓ=j
2− (pℓ+1 + pℓ)
pℓ+1 − pℓ
− (1− pi) ·
i−1∑
ℓ=j
pℓ+1 + pℓ
pℓ+1 − pℓ
=
i−1∑
ℓ=j
2 · pi − (pℓ+1 + pℓ)
pℓ+1 − pℓ
,
observing that in each term of the sum we have pi ≥ pℓ+1, since ℓ ≤ i− 1. Therefore,
M ·∆i(j) ≥
i−1∑
ℓ=j
2pℓ+1 − (pℓ+1 + pℓ)
pℓ+1 − pℓ =
i−1∑
ℓ=j
pℓ+1 − pℓ
pℓ+1 − pℓ = i− j.
If, instead, i < j we have:
M ·∆i(j) = −pi ·
j−1∑
ℓ=i
2− (pℓ+1 + pℓ)
pℓ+1 − pℓ
+ (1− pi) ·
j−1∑
ℓ=i
pℓ+1 + pℓ
pℓ+1 − pℓ
=
j−1∑
ℓ=i
(pℓ+1 + pℓ)− 2pi
pℓ+1 − pℓ
≥
j−1∑
ℓ=i
(pℓ+1 + pℓ)− 2pℓ
pℓ+1 − pℓ
=
j−1∑
ℓ=i
pℓ+1 − pℓ
pℓ+1 − pℓ
= j − i,
where the inequality follows from pi ≤ pℓ. Therefore for j 6= i, we have
∆i(j) ≥ |i− j|
M
. (1)
We now give an upper bound on the probability that the correct urn will be chosen by a voter. Note,
somewhat counter-intuitively, that the probability of a correct vote is higher when this upper bound is smaller
— this is because the ∆i(j) are additive gaps, not multiplicative ones, and so by making the upper bound on
the expected number of votes for the correct urn smaller, the gap ∆i(j) becomes larger relative to the mean.
Recall that the correct urn is pi. We upper-bound the probability that a vote will go to pi:
Ei(i) = pi ·M−1 ·
(
bi +
M −B
n
)
+ (1− pi) ·M−1 ·
(
ri +
M −R
n
)
≤ pi ·
(
M−1 · bi + 1
n
)
+ (1− pi) ·
(
M−1 · ri + 1
n
)
.
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Observe that, by the definition of ǫ, we have that bi =
i−1∑
ℓ=1
2− (pℓ+1 + pℓ)
pℓ+1 − pℓ satisfies bi ≤
2i
ǫ , and furthermore
that ri =
n−1∑
ℓ=i
pℓ+1 + pℓ
pℓ+1 − pℓ ≤
2(n − i)
ǫ
. Thus,
Ei(i) ≤ pi ·
(
2i
ǫM
+
1
n
)
+ (1− pi) ·
(
2(n − i)
ǫM
+
1
n
)
≤ 2n
ǫM
+
1
n
.
We now give an upper bound on M . This will allow us to apply a Chernoff bound and finish the proof.
Recall that M = max(R,B); we will upper bound R+B to get an upper bound on M :
R+B =
n∑
k=1
(rk + bk) ≤
n∑
k=1
(r1 + bn) = n · (r1 + bn) = n ·
n−1∑
ℓ=1
2
pℓ+1 − pℓ
≤ 2 · n(n− 1)
ǫ
.
It follows that
M ≤ 2n(n− 1)
ǫ
. (2)
Therefore, going back to the probability that an urn identical to the correct urn is voted for, we have
Ei(i) ≤ 2n
ǫM
+
1
n
≤ 2n
ǫM
+
1
n
· 2n(n− 1)
Mǫ
≤ 4n
ǫM
.
Furthermore, since ∆i(j) > 0 for each j 6= i, we have that the urn pi is the most likely urn to be voted for,
and therefore Ei(i) ≥ 1n .
We are now ready to state the main theorem of the section. Its proof employs a careful application of
the Chernoff bound, and the inequalities we have derived in this section.
Theorem 2.1. Let urns p1, p2, . . . , pn be given, with urn pi having a pi fraction of blue balls, and a 1− pi
fraction of red balls. Let 0 ≤ p1 < p2 < · · · < pn ≤ 1. Also, let ǫ be ǫ = min1≤i≤n−1(pi+1 − pi). Then,
for Plurality Voting, O (n3ǫ−2 ln η−1) voters are sufficient to guarantee a probability of at least 1 − η that
the correct urn receives the most votes.
Proof. Observe that ǫ ≤ 1n−1 . Choose some η ∈ (0, 1), and suppose the number of players is m =⌈
108 · M(n−1)ǫ · ln 4η
⌉
— we will show that m players will be enough to choose the correct option with
probability is at least 1− η. Observe that, given our upper bound M ≤ 2n(n−1)ǫ , we have
m ≤
⌈
216 · (n − 1)
2n
ǫ2
⌉
.
Recall that we say that the players lose if an urn with a different distribution from the unknown urn
wins the election. We will upper-bound the probability that the players lose, using the following form of the
Chernoff bound:
Theorem 2.2 (Chernoff bound). Let X1, . . . ,Xm be independent 0/1 random variables with expectation
E[Xi] = pi, for i = 1, . . . , n. Let µ =
∑
i pi. Then, for each δ ≥ 0, it holds that
Pr
[∑
i
Xi > (1 + δ) · µ
]
≤ exp
(
−min
(
δ, δ2
)
3
· µ
)
,
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and,
Pr
[∑
i
Xi < (1− δ) · µ
]
≤ exp
(
−δ
2
3
· µ
)
.
We now show how to use Theorem 2.2, together with the bounds derived in Section 5.1, to prove
Theorem 2.1. Let Vj be the number of votes to pj in the random election, with unknown urn i. Then,
E[Vj ] = Ei(j) ·m. We have,
Pr[the players lose] = Pr[pi did not collect more votes than any other urn]
≤ Pr
[
Vi < E[Vi]− m
3M
]
+
n∑
j=0
j 6=i
Pr
[
Vj > E[Vi]− 2m
3M
]
Since ∆i(j) ≥ |i−j|M we have E[Vi] ≥ E[Vj ] + |i−j|M ·m, and
Pr[the players lose] ≤ Pr
[
Vi < E[Vi]
(
1− m
3ME[Vi]
)]
+
n∑
j=0
j 6=i
Pr
[
Vj > E[Vj ]
(
1 +
|i− j|
ME[Vj ]
·m− 2m
3ME[Vj ]
)]
≤ Pr
[
Vi < E[Vi]
(
1− m
3ME[Vi]
)]
+
n∑
j=0
j 6=i
Pr
[
Vj > E[Vj ]
(
1 +
|i− j|m
3ME[Vj ]
)]
≤ exp
(
− m
2
27M2E[Vi]
)
+ 2
n∑
k=1
exp
(
−min
{
km
9M
,
k2m2
27M2E[Vj ]
})
,
by E[Vj ] ≤ E[Vi] ≤ m · 4(n−1)ǫM ,
Pr[the players lose] ≤ exp
(
− m
2 ǫM
108M2m (n− 1)
)
+ 2
n∑
k=1
exp
(
−min
{
km
9M
,
k2m2ǫM
108M2m (n− 1)
})
≤ exp
(
− mǫ
108M (n− 1)
)
+ 2
n∑
k=1
exp
(
−min
{
km
9M
,
k2mǫ
108M (n− 1)
})
≤ exp
(
− mǫ
108M (n− 1)
)
+ 2
n∑
k=1
exp
(
− k
2mǫ
108M (n− 1) ·min
{
12 (n − 1)
kǫ
, 1
})
≤ exp
(
− mǫ
108M (n− 1)
)
+ 2
n∑
k=1
exp
(
−k2 ln 4
η
)
≤ η
4
+ 2
n∑
k=1
(η
4
)k
≤ η
4
+ 2 · η
4− η ≤
η
4
+ 2 · η
3
< η.
It follows that ifm = Θ(n3ǫ−2 log η−1), and voters apply the aforementioned voting scheme, the probability
of winning is at least 1− η.
3 A Connection to Proper Scoring Rules
In this section we discuss the connection between our upper bound and the notion of a proper scoring
rule [11]. We first show how to obtain a strategy for a set of voters in the two-signal case using proper
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scoring rules.2 We then show that basing a strategy on proper scoring rules cannot lead to an asymptotically
tight result: any voting strategy based on the functions arising from the framework of proper scoring rules
requires at least Ω
(
nǫ−4
)
voters. This is weaker than the upper bound ofO(n3ǫ−2 log η−1) that we obtained
in Section 2 in two important respects. First, by the pigeon-hole principle, ǫ ≤ 1n−1 , and therefore approach
from the previous section is always at least as good as the approach based on proper scoring rules, and often
much better. More significantly, when n is a constant, the approach via scoring rules gives a dependence
on ǫ of O(ǫ−4), whereas our approach from Section 2 gives O(ǫ−2), which is optimal even if the group
of voters could directly share all their signals. (In other words, even if there were just a single voter who
received all the signals.)
For our purposes in this discussion, it is not necessary to introduce the full theory of proper scoring
rules, but just to provide a self-contained consequence of that theory. The consequence is the following: it is
possible to construct pairs of non-negative functions (f0, f1), each defined over the interval [0, 1], with the
property that for all z ∈ [0, 1], the function
gz(x) = zf0(x) + (1− z)f1(x) (3)
is uniquely maximized at x = z. We will further assume that f0 and f1 each have continuous second
derivatives, which is true of the standard functions that arise from this theory. This defining property of f0
and f1 is all we will need.
From a pair of such functions, here is how we can define a strategy for each voter in the two-signal
case. We have a set of n + 1 urns, where urn i has a probability pi of producing a blue ball. We define
q0 =
∑
i f0(pi) and q1 =
∑
i f1(pi), and let q∗ = max(q1, q0). Now, when a voter draws a blue ball, they
vote for urn i with probability proportional to f0(pi)
q∗
+
q∗ − q0
q∗(n+ 1)
; if they draw a red ball, they vote for urn
i with probability proportional to f1(pi)
q∗
+
q∗ − q1
q∗(n+ 1)
. We call this the strategy induced by f0 and f1.
Suppose the true urn is t; then the number of votes for an urn j is a random variable Xj =
∑
vXjv,
where Xjv is the indicator variable that voter v votes for j. With k voters, we have
E [Xj ] =
k
q∗
(ptf0(pj) + (1− pt)f1(pj)) + |q1 − q0| k
q∗(n + 1)
=
k
q∗
gpt(pj) +
|q1 − q0| k
q∗(n+ 1)
. (4)
By the defining property of f0 and f1, we see that E [Xj ] is uniquely maximized at j = t. Hence for a
sufficiently large set of voters, the number of votes received by urn t will exceed the number received by all
other urns with high probability.
Thus, the strategy induced by any proper scoring rule will produce the true urn with high probability
when there are enough voters. It can be viewed, in a sense, as a much simpler version of the construction in
Section 2, and we now show that this simpler approach results in asymptotically larger number of voters.
Theorem 3.1. Let f0 and f1 be any functions with continuous second derivatives that satisfy the defining
property of proper scoring rules from Equation (3). Then in order for the strategy induced by f0 and f1 to
identify the true urn with high probability, there must be Ω(nǫ−4) voters.
Proof. We start with a basic claim about sums of Bernoulli trials. Let X =∑ki1 Xi be a sum of independent
0-1 random variables, where E [Xi] = pi ≤ 12 . The mean of X is µ =
∑k
i=1 pi. Then with constant
probability, X will deviate by at least a constant multiple of
√
VarX from µ. More concretely, there are
absolute constants α > 0 and β > 0 so that with probability at least α, we have X < µ− β√VarX . Now,
since
VarXi = pi(1− pi) ≥ pi/2,
2We are grateful to Bobby Kleinberg for identifying this connection between voting strategies and proper scoring rules.
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we have
VarX =
k∑
i=1
VarXi ≥
k∑
i=1
pi/2 ≥ µ/2.
Now, for a given δ > 0, suppose we have µ < β2/(2δ2). Then equivalently, δ < β/
√
2µ, so
δµ < β
√
µ/2 ≤ β
√
VarX.
Hence with probability at least α > 0, we have X < (1−δ)µ. It follows that in order to ensure X ≥ (1−δ)µ
with probability going to 1, we must have µ ≥ Ω(1/δ2).
Now, recall that there are k voters, and consider the voting strategy induced by the functions f0 and f1.
Since the first derivatives f ′0 and f ′1 are continuous functions defined over the compact set [0, 1], there is a
constant c1 such that |f ′0(x)|, |f ′1(x)| ≤ c1 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. For the same reason, there is a constant c2
such that |f ′′0 (x)|, |f ′′1 (x)| ≤ c2 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Using the bound on the first derivative, for any γ > 0 we
can find an interval [u, v] ⊆ [0, 1] such that the following hold: (i) d = inf
x∈[u,v]
min(f0(x), f1(x)) > 0, (ii)
v/u < 1 + γ, (iii) (1− u)/(1 − v) < 1 + γ,
(iv) sup
x,y∈[u,v]
f0(y)
f0(x)
< 1 + γ, and (v) sup
x,y∈[u,v]
f1(y)
f1(x)
< 1 + γ.
It follows that if our probabilities p0, p1, . . . , pn all lie in this interval [u, v], then
E [Xj ] ∈
[
(1− γ1)k
n
,
(1 + γ1)k
n
]
for a constant γ1 that goes to 0 with γ. Also, we have q∗ ≥ dn.
Now, for any ǫ > 0, we choose p0 ≤ p1 ≤ · · · ≤ pn ∈ [u, v] such that pj+1 − pj = ǫ for each j. Let t
be the true urn, and let
h(x) =
k
q∗
(ptf0(x) + (1− pt)f1(x)) + |q1 − q0| k
q∗(n+ 1)
.
Notice that E [Xj ] = h(pj). Now, Taylor’s Theorem implies that for some w ∈ [pt, pt+1], we have
h(pt+1) = h(pt) + (pt+1 − pt)h′(pt) + 1
2
(pt+1 − pt)2h′′(w).
Since h(x) has its global maximum at x = pt, we have h′(pt) = 0. Moreover, since |f ′′0 (x)|, |f ′′1 (x)| ≤ c2
for all x ∈ [0, 1], we have
h′′(w) =
k
q∗
(ptf
′′
0 (x) + (1− pt)f ′′1 (x)) ≤
kc2
dn
.
Writing pt+1 − pt = ǫ, we have
h(pt+1) ≥ h(pt)− kc2
2dn
ǫ2
Since E [Xj ] = h(pj), for all j, this implies
E [Xt+1] ≥ E [Xt]− kc2
2dn
ǫ2.
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Since E [Xt] ≥ (1− γ1)k
n
, this implies that E [Xt+1] ≥ (1 − δ)E [Xt], where δ = c3ǫ2 and c3 =
c2
2(1− γ1)d .
Now, using our initial fact about sums of Bernoulli trials, we must have E [Xt] ≥ Ω(1/δ2) in order for
Xt to have a high probability of exceeding (1− δ)E [Xt]. Since E [Xt] ≤ (1 + γ1)k
n
, this requires
(1 + γ1)k
n
≥ d2
c23ǫ
4
for a constant d2 > 0, and hence
k ≥ d2n
(1 + γ1)c23ǫ
4
.
4 A Tight Lower Bound for Two Signals
In this section we give a tight lower bound that confirms the optimality of the voting scheme for two signals
presented in Section 2. We will start by introducing a class of instances. We will then prove a combinatorial
lemma on how certain parameters of any (asymmetric) voting system for these instances have to behave,
and we use the lemma to prove the lower bound.
We start by defining the lower bound class of instances I(n, ǫ), for any n ≥ 2 and ǫ ≤ 1n−1 . The n urns
in I(n, ǫ) are such that pi = 1− ǫ(n− 1)
2
+ (i− 1)ǫ, for i = 1, . . . , n. Then 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn ≤ 1.
Each voter t is defined by two probability distributions (R1,t, R2,t, . . . , Rn,t), (B1,t, B2,t, . . . , Bn,t): if
she draws a red (resp., blue) ball she will vote for urn i with probability Ri,t (resp., Bi,t).
Given a voting scheme for m voters (that is, 2m probability vectors (Ri,t), (Bi,t)), we define Bi =
m−1 ·∑mt=1Bi,t and Ri = m−1 ·∑mt=1Ri,t, for i = 1, . . . ,m. Thus the expected number of votes Ei(j)
to urn j, if i is the correct urn, will be equal to m · Ei(j) = m · (pi ·Bj + (1− pi) ·Rj) . We also define
∆i(j) = Ei(i) − Ei(j) to be the expected difference between the number of votes to i and j, if i is the
correct urn, averaged over the m voters.
We say that a voting scheme is proper if ∆i(j) ≥ 0, for each i, j. The challenge in proving the lower
bound lies in the fact that proper voting schemes can succeed in identifying the correct urn for what seem
to be a variety of different reasons, and so we need to find a common property they have which implies that
the correct urn only “narrowly” wins the election over other urns with very similar distributions. This is the
content of the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let n and ǫ be n ≥ 10 and ǫ ≤ 1n−1 . Then all proper voting schemes for I(n, ǫ) satisfy:
(a) B1 ≤ B2 ≤ · · · ≤ Bn ≤ 9n and 9n ≥ R1 ≥ R2 ≥ · · · ≥ Rn;
(b) Ei(i) ≤ 9n , for i = 1, . . . , n.
(c) There exists a set S ⊆ [n] and ι ∈ {−1,+1}, with |S| ≥ n4 − 3 ln n − 14, such that for each i ∈ S,
we have
max (|Ri −Ri+ι| , |Bi −Bi+ι|) < e
7
2 ·
√|Ri −Bi|
n
3
2
,
and
∆i(i+ ι),∆i+ι(i) ≤ 2e
7
2 · ǫ ·
√
|Ri −Bi|
n
3
2
.
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The crux of the lemma is to show that for many pairs of urns i, i+ ι, the election will be very “close”: if
i is the correct urn, it does not win the election by a large margin over i+ ι in expectation (and vice versa).
The lemma shows further that, averaged over the voters, the difference between the probability of voting for
i given a red (resp., blue) ball and the probability of voting for i+ ι given the same color is small.
This upper bound is crucial for the proof of the lower-bound theorem, stated next: we will show that
— even if we only cared about urns i, i + ι — the variance of a voter’s choice can be lower-bounded by
Ω(|Ri,t −Bi,t|). This, assuming that the total variance is at least some constant, will allow us to apply
an anti-concentration inequality to show that the expected margin ∆i(i + ι) of urn i over urn i + ι will be
surpassed by Θ
(
ln η−1
)
standard deviations of the number of votes to urn i and i+ι. It will follow that with
probability Ω(η) the election will be won by the wrong urn. Again, this argument requires that the variance
be at least some sufficiently large constant; if the variance is actually smaller than this constant, we will use
a different argument showing that the voting system is sufficiently “inflexible” that if urn i wins when it is
correct, the same pattern of votes is likely to also arise — favoring i — when i+ ι is actually correct.
Proof. We will first show that in a proper voting scheme, for each i < j it holds that Bi ≤ Bj and Ri ≥ Rj .
This implies B0 ≤ B1 ≤ · · · ≤ Bn−1 and R0 ≥ R1 ≥ · · · ≥ Rn−1. By contradiction,
• if Bi < Bj and Ri < Rj , then Ek(j) > Ek(i) for each k: in particular for k = i, which would give
∆i(j) < 0, contradicting the properness of the voting scheme;
• the same argument gives a contradiction if Bi > Bj and Ri > Rj (choosing k = j);
• finally, assume Bi > Bj , Ri < Rj , and that Ei(i) > Ei(j), Ej(i) < Ej(j); then,
Ei(i)− Ej(i) > Ei(j) − Ej(j)
(pi − pj)Bi + (pj − pi)Ri > (pi − pj)Bj + (pj − pi)Rj
(pi − pj)(Bi −Bj) > (pj − pi)(Rj −Ri),
then, by pi < pj , we have
(Rj −Ri) + (Bi −Bj) < 0,
which is impossible since the left-hand side is positive by Bi > Bj and Rj > Ri.
It follows that Bi ≤ Bj and Ri ≥ Rj . We now show that Bn ≤ 9n (resp., R1 ≤ 9n ). Since {Bi}ni=1 and
{Ri}ni=1 are probability distributions, one has that
∣∣{i | Bi +Ri ≤ 4n}∣∣ ≥ n2 , for otherwise
2 =
n∑
i=1
Bi +
n∑
i=1
Ri ≥
n∑
i=1
Bi+Ri>
4
n
Ei(i) >
n
2
· 4
n
≥ 2.
Since p⌊n+1
2
⌋ ≥ 1−ǫ2 (resp., p⌈n+12 ⌉ ≤
1+ǫ
2 ), it follows that there exists some i such that Bi + Ri ≤ 4n and
pi ≥ 1−ǫ2 (resp., pi ≤ 1+ǫ2 ). Observe that Ei(i) ≤ 4n . Now, by contradiction, let Bn > 9n (R1 > 9n ); by n ≥
10 we have ǫ ≤ 1n−1 ≤ 19 ; therefore pi ≥ 49 (pi ≤ 59 ) one has Ei(n) ≥ pi · Bn > 4n (Ei(1) ≥ pi · R1 > 4n ).
It follows that ∆i(n) (∆i(1)) is negative, contradicting properness.
We define δi = |Ri −Bi|. Then δn ≤ Bn ≤ 9n and δ1 ≤ R1 ≤ 9n . Let kr be the largest integer such that
Rkr+1 ≥ Bkr+1, and kb be the largest integer such that Bn−kb ≥ Rn−kb . Observe that (a) if i ≤ kr then
δi ≥ δi+1, (b) if i ≥ n − kb + 1 then δi ≥ δi−1, and (c) kr + kb ≥ n − 2. By (c) at least one of kr and kb
11
has to be at least n2 − 1. We let SR and SB be
SR =
{
i | Ri+1 ≥ Bi+1 ∧max (Ri −Ri+1, Bi+1 −Bi) < e7/2 ·
√
Ri −Bi
n3/2
}
,
SB =
{
i | Bi−1 ≥ Ri−1 ∧max (Ri−1 −Ri, Bi −Bi−1) < e7/2 ·
√
Bi −Ri
n3/2
}
.
Then SR ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , kr} and SB ⊆ {n− kb + 1, n − kb + 2, . . . , n − 1, n}. We consider two cases:
• suppose kr ≥ n2 − 1. We relabel the element in SR = [kr]− SR, using r =
∣∣SR∣∣:
SR = {i1, i2, . . . , ir},
with i1 < i2 < · · · < ir. We have δ1 ≥ δ2 ≥ · · · ≥ δkr ≥ δkr+1. Then, for 1 ≤ t ≤ r − 1,
δit+1 ≤ δit+1 ≤ δit − e7/2 ·
√
Rit −Bit
n3/2
= δit − e7/2 ·
√
δit
n3/2
= δit ·
(
1−
√
e7
n3 · δit
)
, (5)
and δi1 ≤ 9n ≤ e
3
n ; we define αk = e
3−k so that δi1 ≤ α0 · n−1. Let ℓ0 = 1 and ℓk =
⌈
n · e−(k+3)/2⌉,
for k ≥ 1. We also let L(k) = ∑kj=0 ℓj . We will show by induction on k that δiL(k) ≤ αk · n−1 =
e3−k · n−1. The case k = 0 has already been verified. We assume k ≥ 1. Then,
δiL(k) ≤ δiL(k)−1 ·
(
1−
√
e7
n3 · δiL(k)−1
)
≤ δiL(k−1) ·
(
1−
√
e7
n3 · δiL(k−1)
)ℓk
≤ δiL(k)−1 ·
(
1−
√
ek+3
n2
)ℓk
= δiL(k−1) ·
(
1− e
k+3
2
n
)ℓk
= δiL(k−1) ·
(
1− e
k+3
2
n
)⌈ n
e
(k+3)/2
⌉
≤ δiL(k−1) · e−1 ≤ e3−k · n−1.
Now, if k ≥ 11 + 3 lnn, we have δiL(k) ≤ n3 · e−8; by (5), we would then get δiL(k)+1 ≤ δiL(k) ·
(1− e) < 0 — since δir ≥ 0, by ir ≤ kr, this implies that r =
∣∣SR∣∣ < L (⌈11 + 3 ln n⌉). We now
upper bound L(k) to get an upper bound on r =
∣∣SR∣∣:
L(k) =
k∑
j=0
ℓj = 1 +
k∑
j=1
⌈
n · e− k+32
⌉
= k + 1 + n ·
k∑
j=1
e−
k+3
2 ≤ k + 1 + n · e−5/2 ·
∞∑
j=0
e−
k/2
= k + 1 + n · e−5/2 · 1
1− e−1/2 = k + 1 +
n
e5/2 − e2 ≤
n
4
+ k + 1.
It follows that r =
∣∣SR∣∣ < L (⌈11 + 3 ln n⌉) ≤ n4 + ⌈11 + 3 ln n⌉ + 1 ≤ n4 + 3 ln n + 13, and
therefore
|SR| ≥ kr − n
4
− 3 ln n− 13 ≥ n
4
− 3 ln n− 14.
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• Otherwise, kr < n2 − 1 and therefore kb > n2 − 1. A proof similar to the previous case gives
|SB| ≥ kb − n
4
− 3 lnn− 13 ≥ n
4
− 3 lnn− 14.
Therefore, at least one of SR and SR has cardinality at least n4 − 3 ln n− 14. If SR is the largest one we
pick ι = 1 and S = SR. Otherwise, we pick ι = −1 and S = SB . Observe that the choice satisfies the first
requirement of point (c) in the statement.
We now prove the second requirement of point (c). Let i be an element of S, β = Bi − Bi+ι, and
ρ = Ri −Ri+ι. Then, |β| = −ιβ and |ρ| = ιρ. Also,
|β| , |ρ| ≤ e 72 ·
√|Ri −Bi|
n
3
2
.
Recall that ∆i(i + ι) = Ei(i) − Ei(i + ι) = βpi + ρ(1 − pi) and ∆i+ι(i) = Ei+ι(i + ι) − Ei+1(i) =
−βpi+ι − ρ(1− pi+ι). Suppose that at least one of ∆i(i+ ι) and ∆i+ι(i) is larger than 2e 72 ǫ
√
|Ri−Bi|
n
3
2
. By
the properness of the voting system, we would have:
∆i(i+ ι) + ∆i+ι(i) > 2e
7
2 · ǫ ·
√
|Ri −Bi|
n
3
2
β(pi − pi+ι) + ρ(pi+ι − pi) > 2e
7
2 · ǫ ·
√
|Ri −Bi|
n
3
2
,
by the definition of the instance, we have that pi+ι − pi = ι · ǫ, therefore we would have
|β|+ |ρ| > 2e 72 ·
√|Ri −Bi|
n
3
2
which would imply that at least one of |β| and |ρ| is larger than e 72 ·
√
|Ri−Bi|
n
3
2
, a contradiction. It follows
that both ∆i(i+ ι) and ∆i+ι(i) are less than or equal
∆i(i+ ι),∆i+ι(i) ≤ 2e
7
2 · ǫ ·
√
|Ri −Bi|
n
3
2
.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a positive constant H such that for any η < H , one has that any voting scheme
for I(n, ǫ), with n ≥ 120 and ǫ ≤ 111(n−1) using at most O
(
n3
ǫ2
log 1η
)
voters will fail to win the election
with probability Ω(η).
Proof. Take any asymmetric voting scheme for I(n, ǫ) with m voters — that is, a sequence of m vectors
(R1,t, . . . , Rn,t) and (B1,t, . . . , Bn,t), for 1 ≤ t ≤ m, such that the probability that the tth voter votes
for the ith urn if she draws a blue (resp., red) ball is Bi,t (resp., Ri,t). Let Bi = m−1 ·
∑m
t=1Bi,t and
Ri = m
−1 ·∑mt=1Ri,t.
If the voting scheme is improper, then by definition there exists i, j such that ∆i(j) < 0. Otherwise, by
n ≥ 120, one has n4 − 3 lnn− 14 ≥ 1, and by Lemma 4.1, there will exist two urns i and j ∈ {i− 1, i+1}
such that ∆i(j) ≤ 2e 72 ǫ
√
|Ri−Bi|
n
3
2
.
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Given i, j, we define the head-to-head (i, j)-voting process as follows; for each voter t, the random
variable Xt = Xt(i, j) will be defined as
Xt =


1 if voter t votes for urn j, given that the unknown urn is i,
1/2 if voter t does not vote for urns i or j, given that the unknown urn is i,
0 if voter t votes for the unknown urn i.
Observe that X =
∑m
t=1Xt ≥ m2 iff the number of votes to urn j is not smaller than the number of votes to
the right urn i. In this case, the voters will lose the election. Furthermore,
E[X] =
m
2
− m
2
·∆i(j).
Since X is the sum of independent random variables, we have that Var[X] =
∑m
t=1Var[Xt]; by ǫ ≤
1
11(n − 1), we have that 511 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn ≤ 611 . We will use that pi, 1 − pi ≥ 14 for each i, to
lower-bound the variance of Xt:
Var[Xt] = (pi ·Bi,t + (1− pi) ·Ri,t) · (0− E[Xt])2 + (pi ·Bj,t + (1− pi) · Rj,t) · (1−E[Xt])2
+ (pi · (1−Bi,t −Bj,t) + (1− pi) · (1−Ri,t −Rj,t)) ·
(
1
2
− E[Xt]
)2
.
We consider two cases:
• if E[Xt] ≥ 14 , then
Var[Xt] ≥ (piBi,t + (1− pi)Ri,t) · (0− E[Xt])2 ≥ Ri,t +Bi,t
4
· 1
16
≥ |Ri,t −Bi,t|
64
.
• if E[Xt] < 14 , we have
Var[Xt] ≥ (piBj,t + (1− pi)Rj,t) (1−E[Xt])2
+ (pi(1−Bi,t −Bj,t) + (1− pi)(1 −Ri,t −Rj,t))
(
1
2
− E[Xt]
)2
≥ piBj,t + (1− pi)Rj,t
16
+
pi(1−Bi,t −Bj,t) + (1− pi)(1−Ri,t −Rj,t)
16
=
pi(1−Bi,t) + (1− pi)(1 −Ri,t)
16
.
The latter is equal to both 116pi(Ri,t−Bi,t) + (1−Ri,t) and 116(1− pi)(Bi,t −Ri,t) + (1−Bi,t); we
can therefore get a lower bound of
Var[Xt] ≥ 1
16
·min(pi, 1− pi) · |Ri,t −Bi,t| ≥ |Ri,t −Bi,t|
64
It follows that Var[X] =
∑m
t=1Var[Xt] ≥ 164 ·
∑m
t=1 |Ri,t −Bi,t|.
Recall that m · Ri =
∑m
t=1Ri,t and m · Bi =
∑m
t=1Bi,t. Suppose Ri ≥ Bi; then
m · |Ri −Bi| = m · (Ri −Bi) = m ·
m∑
t=1
(Ri,t −Bi,t) ≤ m ·
m∑
t=1
|Ri,t −Bi,t| ≤ 64 · Var[X].
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If, on the other hand, Bi > Ri, we have
m · |Ri −Bi| = m · (Bi −Ri) = m ·
m∑
t=1
(Bi,t −Ri,t) ≤ m ·
m∑
t=1
|Bi,t −Ri,t| ≤ 64 · Var[X].
Therefore, in any case, we have Var[X] ≥ m|Ri−Bi|64 .
We now give a different lower bound on Var[X], that we will use to deal with the case of very small
variance Var[X]. Let p1,t, p1/2,t, p0,t be, respectively, the probabilities that Xt = 1,Xt = 12 and Xt = 0.
Then, E[Xt] = p1,t + 12 · p1/2,t, and
Var[Xt] = p1,t · (E[Xt]− 1)2 + p1/2,t ·
(
E[Xt]− 1
2
)2
+ p0,t · (E[Xt])2
We consider three cases:
• if p1,t = max
(
p1,t, p1/2,t, p0,t
) ≥ 13 then if E[Xt] ≤ 34 we have
Var[Xt] ≥ p1,t · (E[Xt]− 1)2 ≥ 1
3
· 1
42
=
1
48
≥ 1− p1,t
48
.
If instead E[Xt] > 34 , then
Var[Xt] ≥ p1/2,t
(
E[Xt]− 1
2
)2
+ p0,t (E[Xt])
2 >
p1/2,t
42
+
p0,t
42
≥ 1− p1,t
16
.
• If p0,t = max
(
p1,t, p1/2,t, p0,t
) ≥ 13 then we employ a similar approach. If E[Xt] ≥ 14 we have
Var[Xt] ≥ p0,t · (E[Xt])2 ≥ 1
3
· 1
42
=
1
48
≥ 1− p0,t
48
.
If E[Xt] < 14 , then
Var[Xt] ≥ p1/2,t
(
E[Xt]− 1
2
)2
+ p1,t (E[Xt]− 1)2 ≥
p1/2,t
42
+
p1,t
42
≥ 1− p0,t
16
.
• If p1/2,t = max
(
p1,t, p1/2,t, p0,t
) ≥ 13 , then 16 ≤ E[Xt] ≤ 56 , and
Var[Xt] ≥ p1,t (E[Xt]− 1)2 + p0,t (E[Xt])2 ≥ p1,t
62
+
p0,t
62
≥ 1− p1/2,t
36
.
In each of the three cases, we had Var[Xt] ≥ 1−max(p1,t,p1/2,t,p0,t)48 , and therefore
Var[X] =
m∑
t=1
Var[Xt] ≥ 1
48
·
m∑
t=1
(
1−max (p1,t, p1/2,t, p0,t)) .
Let us now assume that Var[X] ≤ 172 · log5 1η . We will deal with the case Var[X] > 172 · log5 1η later.
The previous inequality then implies
m∑
t=1
(
1−max (p1,t, p1/2,t, p0,t)) ≤ 23 log5 1η .
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Recall that X = X(i, j) ≥ m2 iff the unknown urn i gets at most as many votes as j (and therefore the
election is lost). In the following we will also consider X ′ = X(j, i); we have that X ′ ≤ m2 iff urn i gets at
least as many votes as the unknown urn j (this also implies that the election is lost).
Observe that, since 511 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn ≤ 611 , no matter what the unknown urn is, the probability
that any specific voter votes for any specific urn changes by a constant factor (between 56 and 65 ) if one
changes the unknown urn.
We now show that, given that Var[x] ≤ 172 · log5 η−1, then with probability at least η/9 each voter will
vote according to its maximum probability choice: that is
Pr[∀t,Xt equals the value xt that maximizes Pr[Xt = xt]] ≥ η
9
.
If these choices let an urn different from i win the election, we have proven the theorem. Otherwise, we
show that — if we exchange the unknown urn with any other urn k — then still with probability at least η/25
each voter t will vote for the same urn xt; implying either a tie at the top, or that i (which would then not be
the correct urn anymore) would will the election.
We let st denote the sum of the two minimum probabilities in {p1,t, p1/2,t, p0,t}; that is st = 1 −
max
(
p1,t, p1/2,t, p0,t
)
. Observe that st ≤ 1 − 13 = 23 for each t. If we define s =
∑m
t=1 st, we also have
s ≤ 23 log5 η−1.
We have,
Pr [∀t,Xt equals the value xt that maximizes Pr[Xt = xt]] =
m∏
t=1
(1− st).
We now lower-bound the product, using the following greedy algorithm: take one of the largest st′ < 23 ,
and one of the smallest st > 0, with st 6= st′ . Then move x = min
(
2
3 − st′ , st
)
> 0 mass from st to
st′ . Observe that the sum s of the st’s remains constant throughout the process; furthermore the product∏t
m=1 st decreases: indeed, consider the product of st · st′ before and after the change — we can disregard
the rest since it remains constant. Let st, st′ be the two values before the change, and st − x, st′ + x be the
two values after the change. That product used to be st · st′ , and becomes st · st′ − x(st′ − st) − x2 —
the latter is smaller than st · st′ since x > 0 and st′ > st. Note also that at each step one of the st’s stops
being considered (either because it becomes equal to 23 or equal to 0) — therefore the algorithm terminates.
At termination there will exist at most one st with value different from 23 and 0. Furthermore, recalling that
s =
∑m
t=1 st, we conclude that then there will exist exactly
⌈
s
2/3
⌉
different st’s with value 2/3, one with
value 0 ≤ s−
⌈
s
2/3
⌉
· 23 < 23 , and all the others having null value.
Given that s ≤ 23 log5 η−1, we can then minimize the former probability with
Pr[∀t,Xt equals the value xt that maximizes Pr[Xt = xt]] =
m∏
t=1
(1− st)
≥ 3−
⌈
s
2/3
⌉
−1
≥ 3−⌈log5 η−1⌉−1
≥ 1
9
· 3− log5 η−1
≥ 1
9
η
1
log3 5 ≥ η
9
.
If these sequence of votes guarantees that the unknown urn i loses the election, we are done. Otherwise, we
exchange the roles of urns i and j.
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Recall that 56 ≤ pipj ,
1−pi
1−pj
≤ 65 — and therefore, for each t, s′t ≤ 65st ≤ 45 . Indeed, let {a, b, c} =
{1, 1/2, 0} be such that pa,t ≤ pb,t ≤ pc,t. If one lets p′1,t, p′1/2,t, p′0,t be the probabilities that voter t, with
unknown urn j, will, respectively, vote for i, for an urn other than i and j, and for urn j, then we have
that p′1,t ≤ 65p1,t, p′1/2,t ≤ 65p1/2,t and p′0,t ≤ 65p0,t. Therefore p′a,t + p′b,t ≤ 65 (pa,t + pb,t). It follows that
s′t = 1− p′c,t = p′a,t + p′b,t ≤ 65 (pa,t + pb,t) = 65st, which is upper bounded by 65 · st ≤ 65 · 23 = 45 .
Observe that the sum s′ of the s′t’s, s′ =
∑m
t=1 s
′
t, is then at most 65 times the sum s of the st’s; that is,
s′ ≤ 65s ≤ 45 log5 η−1.
Let X ′t be the random variable that, if the unknown urn is j, has value 1 if the t-th voter votes for urn i,
0 if she votes for urn j, and 1/2 otherwise; we have:
Pr
[∀t,X ′t equals the value xt that maximizes Pr[Xt = xt]] = m∏
t=1
(1− s′t).
Using the same greedy algorithm as before, but moving mass x = min
(
4
5 − s′t′ , s′t
)
from couples of s′t’s
such that s′t′ <
4
5 and s
′
t > 0, s
′
t′ 6= s′t, we get that the previous product is minimized when exactly
⌈
s′
4/5
⌉
distinct s′t’s exist having value 4/5, one having value 0 ≤ s′ −
⌈
s
4/5
⌉
· 45 < 45 , and the rest having null value.
Then,
Pr
[∀t,X ′t equals the value xt that maximizes Pr[Xt = xt]] = m∏
t=1
(1− s′t)
≥ 5−
⌈
s′
4/5
⌉
−1
≥ 5−
⌈
4
5
·
log5 η
−1
4/5
⌉
−1
≥ 5−⌈log5 η−1⌉−1 ≥ η
25
.
Now, if urn i won with this sequence of votes, it follows that j cannot win.
We have shown that if Var[X] ≤ 172 log5 η−1, then the probability of winning is at most 1− η25 . We now
assume Var[X] > 172 log5 η
−1
. We will use the following anti-concentration inequality (see Theorem 7.3.1
in [14], and [9]) to finish the proof:
Theorem 4.3 ( [9, 14]). Let X =∑ni=1Xi, where Xi are independent random variables, with Xi ∈ [0, 1],
for i = 1, . . . , n. Let σ2 = Var[X] be σ2 ≥ 40000. Then, for each t ∈
[
0, σ
2
100
]
, it holds that
Pr [X ≥ E[X] + t] ≥ c · exp
(
− t
2
3σ2
)
,
for some universal constant c > 0.
We apply Theorem 4.3 on the random variable X = X(i, j), choosing t =
√
64e7mVar[X]
n3ǫ−2
, if ∆i(j) ≥ 0,
and t = 0 otherwise. This choice is valid since
0 ≤ t
Var[X]
≤
√
m · 64e
7
n3ǫ−2Var[X]
<
√
m · 4608e
7 ln 5
n3ǫ−2 ln η−1
≤ 1
100
,
where the latter holds if m ≤ 1
46080000e7 ln 5
· n3ǫ−2 ln η−1.
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We also need Var[X] ≥ 40000 to apply Theorem 4.3. Since Var[X] > 172 log5 η−1, and η ≤ H , we
choose H to be H = 5−2880000, obtaining Var[X] > 40000.
Observe that E[X] = m2 − m2 · ∆i(j). We show that the event “X ≥ E[X] + t” implies the event
“X ≥ m2 ” (which directly implies that the unknown urn i will not win the election).
If ∆i(j) < 0, the claim is trivial, since then E[X] > m2 , and t is non-negative. Otherwise, by the bound
Var[X] ≥ m · |Ri−Bi|64 , we get
t ≥ m · e7/2ǫ ·
√
|Ri −Bi|
n3
≥ m
2
·∆i(j),
which proves that X ≥ E[X] + t =⇒ X ≥ m2 .
Applying Theorem 4.3, we get
Pr [X ≥ E[X] + t] ≥ c · exp
(
− t
2
3Var[X]
)
= c · exp
(
− 64e
7m
3n3ǫ−2
)
≥ c · exp
(
− 64
3 · 46080000 · ln 5 · ln η
−1
)
≥ c · η.
The proof is then complete.
5 An Upper Bound for Many Signals
In this section we consider the voting problem in its full generality: we have a set of n ≥ 2 urns, with each
urn i = 1, . . . , n inducing a distinct probability distribution Pi = (pi,1, pi,2, . . . , pi,C) over a set of C signals
or colors. Let ǫ be the minimum ℓ1 distance between the distributions Pi:
ǫ = min
i 6=j
ℓ1(Pi, Pj) = min
i 6=j
C∑
c=1
|pi,c − pj,c| .
Observe that when C = 2, this parameter ǫ is twice the one that we used in Section 2.
Theorem 5.1. There exists a voting scheme that, using m = Θ
(
(C logC)2n3
ǫ2
ln nη
)
voters, guarantee that
the unknown urn wins with probability at least 1− η.
The proof of this Theorem spans two subsections (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). In Section 5.1 we generalize
the bichromatic voting scheme so (a) to treat urns that are not “well-separated” as if they were the same –
this virtually increases the separation parameter ǫ – and (b) to guarantee, under some conditions, that the
equivalent of the M parameter of the bichromatic voting scheme of Section 2 is not just upper bounded by
O(n2ǫ−1), but is actually asymptotic to Θ(n2ǫ−1).
In Section 5.2, we use both these properties to devise a new voting scheme that uses the generalized
bichromatic one as a black box. The main idea of the multicolor voting scheme is to force voters to view the
urns as bichromatic ones: each voter will choose a color c at random, and consider each urn as a bichromatic
urn with colors c, c¯ — that is, she will imagine that there are only two colors: “c” and “any color other
than c”. Using this trick directly with the bichromatic voting scheme of section 2 would decrease to 0 the
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minimum distance between urns in the worst case. We do not want the separation between urns to decrease
— since that would increase the minimum number of voters needed for the election to be successful — this
is where property (a) of the generalized bichromatic voting scheme becomes pivotal. Also, we need a way
to aggregate the votes given to each single urn, in each of the (c, c¯) bichromatic instances; this has to be
done in a way that guarantees that the right urn will win with high probability. We manage to do this by
leveraging on property (b).
5.1 A More Flexible Upper Bound with Two Signals
To build a framework that can be used to handle the case of C > 2 signals, it is useful to consider a more
general formulation of the bichromatic problem in which certain options can induce identical distributions
over signals (and hence be indistinguishable from each other). We present the analysis in the language of
urns and colored balls.
Thus, suppose we have a collection of n urns, labeled pi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. With a slight abuse of
notation we let pi and 1 − pi be, respectively, the fraction of blue balls, and of red balls, in urn pi. We
assume w.l.o.g. that 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn ≤ 1.
We assume that one urn is adversarially chosen as the correct one (we will also refer to this as the
unknown urn). Then each player draws a ball from the urn and votes for the name of an urn based on
the color they observe. For this general version with indistinguishable urns, we will be interested in the
probability that the urn receiving the most votes has the same distribution as the correct one; this general
formulation is for the sake of the multi-color case later.
We describe the strategy that the players will use to randomly choose which vote to cast. First of all,
for some n′ ≥ 10, choose 0 ≤ p′1 < p′2 < · · · < p′n′ ≤ 1. Let ǫ = min1≤i≤n′−1
(
p′i+1 − p′i
)
. We require
that (a) for 1 ≤ k ≤
⌈
n′−1
3
⌉
= K it holds that p′k+1 − p′k ≤ 2ǫ and p′n′−k+1 − p′n′−k ≤ 2ǫ, and (b)
p′K+1 ≤ (2K + 1)ǫ and p′n′−K ≥ 1− (2K + 1)ǫ.
The p′i’s are called the landmarks of the voting scheme.
1. Let bk =
k−1∑
ℓ=1
2− (p′ℓ+1 + p′ℓ)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
and rk =
n′−1∑
ℓ=k
p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
for k = 1, . . . , n′.
2. Let φ : {p1, . . . , pn} → {1, . . . , n′} be a mapping from urns to landmarks’ indices, defined so that
φ(pi) = k if k maximizes pibk + (1− pi)rk (ties can be broken arbitrarily).
3. Then define R =
∑n′
k=1
((∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣ + 1) · rk) and B = ∑n′k=1 ((∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) · bk), and set M =
max(R,B).
4. The probability that a voter will vote for pj if a blue ball is drawn is
Pr
P∼f(blue)
[P = pj] = M
−1 ·
(
bφ(pj) +
M −B
n
)
= Bj.
5. The probability that a voter will vote for pj if a red ball is drawn is
Pr
P∼f(red)
[P = pj] = M
−1 ·
(
rφ(pj) +
M −R
n
)
= Rj.
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It is easy to check that the two probability distributions (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) and (R1, R2, . . . , Rn) are
well-defined (their values are non-negative and they both sum up to one). Observe that Bi = Bj and
Ri = Rj if φ(pi) = φ(pj).
For a given urn pi, let k+i be the smallest positive index such that p′k+i
≥ pi, if such an index exists, and
k−i be the largest index such that p′k−i
≤ pi, again if the index exists; observe that at least one of k+i and k−i
has to exist since n′ ≥ 10. We show the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2. For each i = 1, . . . , n, φ(pi) is either equal to k+i or to k
−
i . If, for some i, we have pi = p′k it
follows that φ(pi) = k+i = k−i = k.
Proof. For an arbitrary k it holds that
pi · bk + (1− pi) · rk = pi ·
k−1∑
ℓ=1
2− (p′ℓ+1 + p′ℓ)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
+ (1− pi) ·
n′−1∑
ℓ=k
p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
=
k−1∑
ℓ=1
2pi
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
+
n′−1∑
ℓ=k
p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
− pi ·
n′−1∑
ℓ=1
p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
.
The latter sum does not depend on k. Therefore pibk+(1− pi)rk is maximized with a k that maximizes the
total of the former two sums.
Suppose that k−i exists and that k < k
−
i maximizes the expression; then, by increasing k to k+1 ≤ k−i ,
we would remove the term p
′
k+1+p
′
k
p′k+1−p
′
k
from the second sum, and add the term 2pip′k+1−p′k to the first one. Since,
by definition p′k < p′k+1 ≤ p′k− ≤ pi, we have p′k+1+ p′k < 2pi, and therefore the total value of the first two
sums would increase. It follows that k < k−i cannot maximize the expression.
Analogously, suppose then that k+i exists and that k > k
+
i maximizes the expression; by decreasing k
to k−1 ≥ k+i , we remove the term 2pip′k−p′k−1 from the first sum, and add the term
p′k+p
′
k−1
p′k−p
′
k−1
to the second one.
Since pi ≤ p′k+ ≤ p′k−1 < p′k, we obtain that 2pi < p′k−1 + p′k and therefore we increase the total value of
the first two sums; thus k > k+i does not maximize the expression.
We now turn to computing the probability that a player will vote for pj given that the correct, adversari-
ally chosen, distribution is pi:
Pr
X∼pi
P∼f(X)
[P = pj] = pi Pr
P∼f(blue)
[P = pj] + (1− pi) Pr
P∼f(red)
[P = pj ] = piBj + (1− pi)Rj = Ei(j).
We compute the difference between the probabilities that a vote for urn pi and a vote for urn pj are cast,
given that the correct urn is pi:
∆i(j) = Ei(i) − Ei(j).
We will lower-bound ∆i(j) to bound the number of voters needed to let the voting scheme be successful
with high probability.
Lemma 5.3. For each 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, it holds that
∆i(j) ≥
{
|φ(pi)−φ(pj)|
M if pi = p′k+i = p
′
k−i
max(|φ(pi)−φ(pj)|−1,0)
M otherwise
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Proof. We make the expression of ∆i(j) explicit:
∆i(j) = pi (Bi −Bj) + (1− pi) (Ri −Rj) = pi ·
bφ(pi) − bφ(pj)
M
+ (1− pi) ·
rφ(pi) − rφ(pj)
M
.
Suppose first that φ(pj) < k−i ; then
M ·∆i(j) = pi ·
φ(pi)−1∑
ℓ=φ(pj)
2− (p′ℓ+1 + p′ℓ)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
− (1− pi) ·
φ(pi)−1∑
ℓ=φ(pj)
p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
=
φ(pi)−1∑
ℓ=φ(pj)
2 · pi − (p′ℓ+1 + p′ℓ)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
≥
k−i −1∑
ℓ=φ(pj)
2 · pi − (p′ℓ+1 + p′ℓ)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
≥
k−i −1∑
ℓ=φ(pj)
2 · p′ℓ+1 − (p′ℓ+1 + p′ℓ)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
=
k−i −1∑
ℓ=φ(pj)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
=
∣∣k−i − φ(pj)∣∣ ,
where the first inequality follows from φ(pi) ≥ k−i and the second from pi ≥ p′k−i ≥ p
′
ℓ+1.
If, instead, φ(pj) > k+i we have:
M ·∆i(j) = −pi ·
φ(pj)−1∑
ℓ=φ(pi)
2− (p′ℓ+1 + p′ℓ)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
+ (1− pi) ·
φ(pj)−1∑
ℓ=φ(pi)
p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
=
φ(pj)−1∑
ℓ=φ(pi)
(p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ)− 2pi
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
≥
φ(pj)−1∑
ℓ=k+i
(p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ)− 2pi
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
≥
φ(pj)−1∑
ℓ=k+i
(p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ)− 2p′ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
=
φ(pj)−1∑
ℓ=k+i
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
=
∣∣k+i − φ(pj)∣∣ ,
where the first inequality follows from φ(pi) ≤ k+i and the second from pi ≤ p′k+i ≤ p
′
ℓ.
Also, recall that φ(pi) is an index that maximizes pibφ(pi) + (1− pi)rφ(pi). Since
∆i(j) = M
−1 ·
((
pibφ(pi) + (1− pi)rφ(pi)
)− (pibφ(pj) + (1− pi)rφ(pj))) ,
we have that ∆i(j) ≥ 0 for each ordered couple of urns i, j. The statement follows.
We now give an upper bound on the probability that the correct urn will be chosen by a voter. Note,
somewhat counter-intuitively, that the probability of a correct vote is higher when this upper bound is smaller
— this is because the ∆i(j) are additive gaps, not multiplicative ones, and so by making the upper bound on
the expected number of votes for the correct urn smaller, the gap ∆i(j) becomes larger relative to the mean.
Lemma 5.4. It holds that
Ei(i) ≤ 2(n
′ − 1)
ǫM
+
1
n
.
Proof. Recall that the correct urn is pi. We upper-bound the probability that a vote will actually go to pi:
Ei(i) = pi ·M−1 ·
(
bφ(pi) +
M −B
n
)
+ (1− pi) ·M−1 ·
(
rφ(pi) +
M −R
n
)
≤ pi ·
(
M−1 · bφ(pi) +
1
n
)
+ (1− pi) ·
(
M−1 · rφ(pi) +
1
n
)
.
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Observe that, by the definition of ǫ, we have that bi =
i−1∑
ℓ=1
2− (p′ℓ+1 + p′ℓ)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
is at most bi ≤ 2(i− 1)
ǫ
, and
that ri =
n′−1∑
ℓ=i
p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
≤ 2(n
′ − i)
ǫ
. Thus,
Ei(i) ≤ pi ·
(
2(i− 1)
ǫM
+
1
n
)
+ (1− pi) ·
(
2(n′ − i)
ǫM
+
1
n
)
≤ 2(n
′ − 1)
ǫM
+
1
n
.
We now give an upper bound on M . This will allow us to apply a Chernoff bound and prove the main
theorem.
Lemma 5.5. It holds that
1
81
· (n
′ − 1) · (n+ n′)
ǫ
≤M ≤ 2 · (n
′ − 1) · (n+ n′)
ǫ
.
Proof. Recall that M = max(R,B); we will upper bound R+B to get an upper bound on M :
R+B =
n′∑
k=1
((∣∣φ−1 (p′k)∣∣+ 1) · (rk + bk)) ≤ n
′∑
k=1
(
(∣∣φ−1 (p′k)∣∣+ 1) · (r1 + bn′))
=
n′∑
k=1
((∣∣φ−1 (p′k)∣∣+ 1) ·
n′−1∑
ℓ=1
2
pℓ+1 − pℓ
)
≤
n′∑
k=1
((∣∣φ−1 (p′k)∣∣+ 1) · (n′ − 1) · 2ǫ
)
=
2 · (n′ − 1) · (n+ n′)
ǫ
.
It follows that
M ≤ 2 · (n
′ − 1) · (n+ n′)
ǫ
. (6)
We now move on to the lower bound. Recall that n′ ≥ 10, and that, for each k = 1, 2, . . . ,
⌈
n′−1
3
⌉
= K
(resp., k = n′−K, . . . , n′−1) we have p′k+1−p′k ≤ 2ǫ; also, p′K+1 ≤ (2K+1)ǫ and p′n′−K ≥ 1−(2K+1)ǫ.
Observe that
2K + 1 = 2
⌈
n′ − 1
3
⌉
+ 1 ≤ 2 · n
′ + 1
3
+ 1 ≤ 2 · n
′ + 52
3
≤ 2 · n
′ + n
′
4
3
≤ 5
6
· n′.
Since ǫ = min1≤i≤n′−1 p′i+1 − p′i, we have ǫ ≤ 1n′−1 , and
(2K + 1)ǫ ≤ 5
6
· n
′
n′ − 1 ≤
25
27
.
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We are now ready to lower bound M :
M = max(R,B) ≥ R+B
2
=
1
2
·
n′∑
k=1
((∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣ + 1) · (rk + bk))
=
1
2
·
n′∑
k=1
((∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣ + 1) · n
′−1∑
ℓ=k
p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
)
+
1
2
·
n′∑
k=1
((∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) · k−1∑
ℓ=1
2− (p′ℓ+1 + p′ℓ)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ
)
≥ 1
2
·
n′∑
k=1

(∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) · n
′−1∑
ℓ=max(k,n′−K)
p′ℓ+1 + p
′
ℓ
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ

+
1
2
·
n′∑
k=1

(∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) · min(k−1,K)∑
ℓ=1
2− (p′ℓ+1 + p′ℓ)
p′ℓ+1 − p′ℓ


≥ 1
2
·
n′∑
k=1

(∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) · n
′−1∑
ℓ=max(k,n′−K)
2(1− (2K + 1)ǫ)
2ǫ

+
1
2
·
n′∑
k=1

(∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) · min(k−1,K)∑
ℓ=1
2− 2 · (2K + 1)ǫ
2ǫ

 ,
using the upper bound we previously obtained for (2K + 1)ǫ, we obtain:
M ≥ 1
2
·
n′∑
k=1

(∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣ + 1) · n
′−1∑
ℓ=max(k,n′−K)
2
27ǫ

+ 1
2
·
n′∑
k=1

(∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) · min(k−1,K)∑
ℓ=1
2
27ǫ


≥ 1
27ǫ
·
n′∑
k=1
((∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) · (n′ −max(k, n′ −K) + min(k − 1,K)))
≥ 1
27ǫ
·
n′∑
k=1
((∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) · (min(n′ − k,K) + min(k − 1,K))) ,
observe that (n′ − k) + (k − 1) = n′ − 1 and therefore at least one of (n′ − k) and k − 1 is at least
n′ − 1
2
≥
3
2n
′ − 32
3
=
n′ + n
′−3
2
3
≥ n
′ + 7/2
3
>
⌈
n′ − 1
3
⌉
= K.
Therefore, at least one of min(n′ − k,K),min(k − 1,K) is at least K . Then,
M ≥ 1
27ǫ
·
n′∑
k=1
((∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) ·K) = K
27ǫ
·
n′∑
k=1
(∣∣φ−1(k)∣∣+ 1) = K
27ǫ
· (n+ n′) ≥ (n′ − 1) · (n+ n′)
81 · ǫ .
Therefore, going back to the probability that an urn identical to the correct urn is voted for, we have
Ei(i) ≤ 2(n
′ − 1)
ǫM
+
1
n
≤ 2(n
′ − 1)
ǫ · 181 · (n
′−1)(n+n′)
ǫ
=
162
n+ n′
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5.2 An Upper Bound for Many Signals
In this section we consider the voting problem in its full generality: we have a set of n ≥ 2 urns, with each
urn i = 1, . . . , n inducing a distinct probability distribution Pi = (pi,1, pi,2, . . . , pi,C) over a set of C colors.
Let ǫ be the minimum ℓ1 distance between the distributions Pi:
ǫ = min
i 6=j
ℓ1(Pi, Pj) = min
i 6=j
C∑
c=1
|pi,c − pj,c| .
It turns out that the bichromatic scheme from Section 5.1 has already laid much of the groundwork for
the multi-color case. Each voter u will behave as follows:
1. First, u will choose a color c = c(u) uniformly at random from among all the colors. Voter u will
then imagine the urns as inducing a bichromatic instance by imagining all colors other than c as a
single color c¯. In this way, urn i becomes a bichromatic urn with distribution (pi,c, 1 − pi,c) over its
two colors.
2. Then, voter u will choose an integer t = t(u) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} with T = ⌈log3 C⌉+ 1, in such a way
that Pr[t = i] = α−1 · 3−T+i, where α =∑Ti=0 3−i.
Observe that α <
∑∞
i=0 3
−i = 32 .
3. Voter u will then apply the bichromatic voting scheme from Section 5.1 to choose which urn to vote
for. She will set {p1, p2, . . . , pn} = {p1,c, p2,c, . . . , pn,c}, for i = 1, . . . , n; the sequence of the p′i’s
will be defined as follows:
– first she will pick a subsequence according to the following marking algorithm: set w1 = 0 and
mark all the pj’s such that pj ≤ 3−t · ǫ; if some unmarked pj remains, let i = 2, and
– set wi to be the smallest unmarked pj ,
– mark all the pj’s for which |pj − wi| < 3−t · ǫ;
– if some unmarked pj remains, repeat; otherwise, if wi 6= 1, set wi+1 = 1; then, stop.
4. let i∗ be the length of the sequence {wi}; if i∗ < 10, the voter will add 10 − i∗ elements to {wi}:
let i be such that wi+1 − wi is maximized; the voter will insert the values the values wi + 19(wi+1 −
wi), wi +
2
9(wi+1 − wi), . . . , wi + 89(wi+1 − wi) in the list, keeping it sorted.
The size of the sequence {wi} will then be at least 10.
The voter will then define the sequences xi,1, xi,2 as xi,1 = 2wi+wi+13 , xi,2 =
wi+2wi+1
3 , for i =
1, . . . , i∗ − 1;
5. the voter then merges the sequences wi, xi,1, xi,2, and sorts the resulting sequence increasingly; let
y1 < y2 < · · · < y3i∗−2 be this sequence, and ǫc,t be its separation parameter: ǫc,t = mini=1,...,3i∗−3 yi+1−
yi.
6. then the voter adds elements to {yi} in such a way that:
(a) the minimum separation between adjacent elements remains at least ǫc,t,
(b) if the list has length n′, then for each i = 1, . . . ,
⌈
n′
3
⌉
, it holds that yi+1 − yi ≤ 2ǫc,t, and
(c) if the list has length n′, then for each i =
⌊
2n′
3
⌋
, . . . , n′ − 1, it holds that yi+1 − yi ≤ 2ǫc,t.
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To do so, she applies the following algorithm:
6.1 if (b) is not satisfied, i.e., if the list {yi} has currently length n′ and i is a minimal index i for
which there exists elements yi, yi+1 such that i ≤
⌈
n′
3
⌉
and yi+1 − yi > 2ǫc,t, then insert a new
element between yi and yi+1 of value yi + ǫc,t; this will increase the length of the list; repeat
this step as long as (b) is not satisfied;
6.2 if (c) is not satisfied, i.e., if the list {yi} has currently length n′ and there is a maximal index i for
which there exists elements yi, yi+1 such that i ≥
⌊
2n′
3
⌋
and yi+1− yi > 2ǫc,t, then insert a new
element between yi and yi+1 of value yi+1 − ǫc,t; repeat this step as long as (c) is not satisfied.
It is easy to prove that the above algorithm guarantees properties (a), (b) and (c). Let n′c,t be the length
of the final sequence {yi}, Kc,t =
⌈
n′c,t
3
⌉
, and observe that the algorithm also guarantees that (d)
n′c,t ≥ 10, (e) n′c,t ≤ 3i∗ − 2 + 2(Kc,t + 1) ≤ 9i∗ + 2 ≤ 9n + 2 and (f) yKc,t+1 ≤ (2Kc,t + 1)ǫc,t
and yn′c,t−Kc,t ≥ 1− (2Kc,t + 1)ǫc,t.
The just-defined bichromatic instance depends only on the original multi-colored instance, on c and on
t — we use (c, t)-instance to refer to the bichromatic instance induced by c and t.
Observe that the separation parameter ǫc,t of the (c, t)-instance will be at least ǫc,t ≥ 3−t−3 · ǫ, since
the wi’s are at distance of at least 3−t−2 · ǫ from each other3, and xi,1, xi,2 split the interval between wi and
wi+1 in three equal parts — the subsequently added yi’s do not induce gaps smaller that ǫc,t. Furthermore
the number of landmarks of the (c, t)-instance will be 10 ≤ n′c,t ≤ 9n+ 2 ≤ 10n, since n ≥ 2.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.1, using the machinery built in Section 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. First, given two urns Pi, Pj , we say that a color c is useful for i, j if |pi,c − pj,c| > ǫ3C .
Observe that if Ci,j is the set of useful colors for urns Pi, Pj , we have∑
c∈Ci,j
|pi,c − pj,c| > 2
3
· ǫ.
Indeed, since there are only C colors, the contribution to the ℓ1 distance between Pi and Pj of their non-
useful colors is less than C · ǫ3C = ǫ3 . Given that the total distance is at least ǫ, it follows that the useful
colors contribute by more than 2ǫ3 to the ℓ1 distance of Pi, Pj .
Suppose that i is the unknown urn. Let pi = pi,c and pj = pj,c in the (c, t)-bichromatic instance, for
some c, t. Let E(c,t)i (j) be the expected number of votes that a voter will give to urn j, if i is the unknown
urn, in the (c, t)-bichromatic instance. The analysis of the bichromatic case, guarantees that
E
(c,t)
i (j) ≤ E(c,t)i (i) ≤
162
n+ n′c,t
≤ 162
n
.
and that the difference ∆(c,t)i (j) = E
(c,t)
i (i)− E(c,t)i (j) is at least
∆
(c,t)
i (j) ≥
max (|φ(pi)− φ(pj)| − 1, 0)
Mc,t
.
Fix a color c ∈ Ci,j and let tc,i,j be the smallest non-negative integer such that
|pi,c − pj,c| ≥ ǫ · 3−tc,i,j .
3Before step 4 they were at distance at least 3−tǫ from each other, and step 4 could have added new wi’s at distance at least
3
−t−2 from each other.
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Since c is a useful color we have |pi,c − pj,c| > ǫ3C , and therefore 0 ≤ tc,i,j ≤ ⌈log3C⌉ + 1 = T . By
ǫc,t ≥ 3−t−3 · ǫ, we obtain
ǫc,tc,i,j >
1
81
|pi,c − pj,c| .
Since |pi − pj| ≥ ǫ · 3−tc,i,j , the marking algorithm run by the voters will mark pi and pj at different
iterations — therefore, there are at least three landmarks between pi and pj . It follows that |φ(pi)− φ(pj)| ≥
2. Therefore,
∆
(c,tc,i,j)
i (j) ≥
1
Mc,tc,i,j
≥ 1
2 · (n
′
c,tc,i,j
−1)·(n+n′c,tc,i,j
)
ǫc,tc,i,j
≥ ǫc,tc,i,j
22n(n′c,tc,i,j − 1)
≥ |pi,c − pj,c|
17820 · n2 .
Then,
∆i(j) =
C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
(
1
C
· 1
T
·∆(c,t)i (j)
)
≥ 1
C · T ·
∑
c∈Ci,j
max
t=1,...,T
∆
(c,t)
i (j) ≥
1
C · T ·
∑
c∈Ci,j
∆
(c,tc,i,j)
i (j)
≥ 1
C · T ·
∑
c∈Ci,j
|pi,c − pj,c|
17820 · n2 ≥
ǫ
26730 · C · T · n2 = x.
and
Ei(j) =
C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
(
1
C
· 1
T
· E(c,t)i (j)
)
≤ 162
n
We choose m =
⌈
7 · 1012 · C2·T 2·n3
ǫ2
ln nη
⌉
= Θ
(
(C logC)2·n3
ǫ2
ln nη
)
as the number of voters, and we
apply Chernoff bound (see Theorem 2.2), on Vj: the number of votes to urn j in the election, if i is the
unknown urn. Observe that E[Vj ] = m ·Ei(j), and furthermore:
Pr
[
|Vj − E[Vj ]| > x
3
·m
]
= Pr
[
|Vj − E[Vj ]| > x
3Ei(j)
·Ei(j) ·m
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− x
2
27E2i (j)
·Ei(j) ·m
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− x
2
27Ei(j)
·m
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− ǫ
2
27 · 267302 · C2 · T 2 · n4 · 162n
·m
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− ǫ
2
27 · 267302 · C2 · T 2 · n4 · 162n
·m
)
≤ η
n
.
Applying the Union Bound over all the urns, we have that each single urn j will deviate by at most x3m
from its expected number of votes with probability at least 1 − η, and since the expected difference of the
number of votes of urn i and j if i is the unknown urn is at least m ·∆i(j) ≥ m · x, we have that urn i will
win the election with probability at least 1− η.
6 Other Voting Systems
In this section we study other important voting systems, assuming that there are two types of signals; that is,
assuming bichromatic urns.
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6.1 Cumulative Voting
We show that cumulative voting requires a smaller number of voters for the election to succeed with high
probability. In fact, cumulative voting can be exploited to work with a number of voters as small as the
number of samples used by the optimal centralized algorithm (that is, the algorithm that, after sampling the
minimum number of balls, produces the right guess with high probability).
Like plurality voting, in the cumulative voting election system, each voter has a single vote to cast;
unlike plurality voting, though, the voter can split her vote arbitrarily between the candidates:
Definition 6.1 (Cumulative Voting). Each voter assigns a score to each candidate, in such a way that no
score is negative and the sum of the scores assigned by a voter is 1. The total score of a candidate is the
sum of the scores assigned to that candidate by the voters. If there exists a candidate i having a total score
larger than the total score of each other candidate j 6= i, then i is the winner of the election.
Given urns p1, p2, . . . , pn, the voting scheme we propose for cumulative voting is directly derived from
the plurality voting scheme we proposed earlier; in the new scheme, there are only two possible votes: if a
voter picks a red (resp., blue) ball then she will vote (R1, R2, . . . , Rn) (resp., (B1, B2, . . . , Bn)) — that is,
she will assign a weight of Ri (resp., Bi) to candidate Pi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The Ri’s and the Bi’s are
those that we defined for the plurality voting scheme.
Theorem 6.2. Let urns p1, p2, . . . , pn be given, with urn pi having a pi fraction of blue balls, and a 1− pi
fraction of red balls. Let p1 < p2 < · · · < pn. Also, let ǫ be ǫ = min1≤i≤n−1(pi+1 − pi). Then, for
Cumulative Voting, O
(
ǫ−2 ln 1η
)
voters are sufficient to guarantee a probability of at least 1 − η that the
correct urn wins the election.
Proof. Choose some η ∈ (0, 1), and suppose the number of players is
m =
⌈
150 · ǫ−2 · ln 2
η
⌉
.
We start by using the Chernoff bound to show that the number of voters that pick a ball of some color is
concentrated. If pi ≥ 12 , let X be the number of voters picking a blue ball; otherwise let X be the number of
voters picking a red ball. In both cases, X is the sum of iid binary random variables Xj , with Xj = 1 with
probability max(pi, 1−pi) and Xj = 0 with probability min(pi, 1−pi). Then, E[X] = m ·max(pi, 1−pi)
and m2 ≤ E[X] ≤ m. By Chernoff bound,
Pr
[
|X − E[X]| > ǫ
5
·m
]
≤ Pr
[
|X − E[X]| > ǫ
5
· E[X]
]
≤ 2 · exp
(
− ǫ
2
75
·E[X]
)
≤ 2 · exp
(
− ǫ
2
75
· m
2
)
≤ 2 · exp
(
ln
2
η
)
= η,
that is, with probability 1− η the absolute difference between the number mb of blue (resp., the number mr
of red) balls picked and the expectation pi ·m ((1− pi) ·m) by at most ǫ5m.
For any i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j, let Vi(j) be the fractional number of votes to Pj in the random election, with
unknown urn Pi. Let Di(j) = Vi(i) − Vi(j). Observe that urn i beats urn j in the election (with unknown
urn i) iff Di(j) > 0. The random variable Di(j) is the sum of m iid random variables D′i(j) each taking
value Bi − Bj if the corresponding voter picked a blue ball and Ri − Rj if she picked a red ball; we now
bound the span S of values of D′i(j) — that is, we bound S = |(Bi − Bj) − (Ri − Rj)|. Observe that
Bi −Bj = bi−bjM and Ri −Rj =
ri−rj
M . Also,
bi − bj =
i−1∑
ℓ=0
2− (pℓ+1 + pℓ)
pℓ+1 − pℓ
−
j−1∑
ℓ=0
2− (pℓ+1 + pℓ)
pℓ+1 − pℓ
,
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and
ri − rj =
n−1∑
ℓ=i
pℓ+1 + pℓ
pℓ+1 − pℓ
−
n−1∑
ℓ=j
pℓ+1 + pℓ
pℓ+1 − pℓ
.
Therefore i ≥ j iff bi − bj ≥ 0 and ri − rj ≤ 0 — which implies that |(bi − bj)− (ri − rj)| = |bi − bj |+
|ri − rj| and thus the span S of D′i(j) is equal to S = |Bi −Bj |+ |Ri −Rj|. Furthermore,
|bi − bj | =
max(i,j)−1∑
ℓ=min(i,j)
2− (pℓ+1 + pℓ)
pℓ+1 − pℓ
≤ 2|i− j|
ǫ
.
Analogously, |ri − rj| ≤ 2|i−j|ǫ . It follows that the span of D′i(j) can be upper bounded by
S = |Bi −Bj |+ |Ri −Rj | ≤ 4|i − j|
ǫM
.
Observe that Di(j) is a linear function of the number mb of blue balls picked (and the number mr =
m−mb of red balls picked):
Di(j) = mb · (Bi −Bj) +mr · (Ri −Rj).
Therefore,
E[Di(j)] = m · pi · (Bi −Bj) +m · (1− pi) · (Ri −Rj) = m ·∆i(j),
where ∆i(j) is the functional defined in Section 2; recall that we proved there that ∆i(j) ≥ |i−j|M .
Recall that with probability 1 − η, |mb −m · pi| ≤ ǫ5 ·m. If this event happens we have that, for each
j 6= i,
Di(j) ≥ E[Di(j)] − ǫ
5
·m · S ≥ m ·
(
∆i(j)− 4
5
· |i− j|
M
)
= m · |i− j|
5M
> 0.
Therefore, urn i will beat each urn j 6= i, with probability 1− η. The proof is concluded.
Observe that the previous bound is tight in a strong sense: no algorithm that picks o
(
ǫ−2 ln 1η
)
balls, and
produces a guess arbitrarily after having seen all their colors, is able to guess the right urn with probability
at least 1− η.
6.2 Condorcet Voting
In this section we present a conjecture, and we elaborate on it, with the aim of showing that Condorcet
voting is as good as Cumulative voting — and is thus optimal. We begin by recalling the definition of the
Condorcet voting system:
Definition 6.3 (Condorcet Voting). In a Condorcet election, each voter returns a (total) ordering of the
candidates. Given two candidates i and j, we say that i beats j in a run-off election if more than half the
voters ranked i higher than j. If there exists a candidate i that beats each other candidate j 6= i in a run-off
election, then i is the winner of the Condorcet election.
We observe that, in Condorcet voting, voters do not assign real numbers to candidates as in Cumulative
voting — they rather return a discrete object: a permutation of them.
There exist many variants of the Condorcet election. The differences between them lie in the way of
dealing with ties (that is, when no candidate i beats each other candidate j in a run-off election). Our
main theorem holds for any such variant, since our theorem will guarantee that no ties will exist with high
probability.
We start by defining a set of coefficients that will be useful for introducing a Condorcet voting scheme.
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Definition 6.4. For k ≥ 0 and ℓ ≥ 0, let ck,ℓ be:
ck,ℓ = (−1)k+ℓ ·
(
k + ℓ
k
)
− (−1)
ℓ · (k+ℓk )+ (−1)k+ℓ · (ℓ+ 1)
k + ℓ+ 2
.
We define inductively the sequence bk,ℓ, indexed by two integers; if k < 0 or ℓ < 0 then bk,ℓ = 0; for
notational simplicity we will use:
xk,ℓ =
∑
i,j≥0
i+j≤k
bi,k−i−j · bj,ℓ
(i+ 1)(i + j + 2)
, yk,ℓ =
k∑
i=0
(
(−1)k−i · bi,ℓ
i+ 1
)
.
Then, for k ≥ 0, ℓ ≥ 0, we define bk,ℓ = (k + 1) · (xk−1,ℓ + yk−1,ℓ − ck+1,ℓ).
The induction is well-defined: xk−1,ℓ only depends on the bi,j’s for which either (a) i + j ≤ k − 1, or
(b) i ≤ k − 1 and j = ℓ; yk−1,ℓ only depends on the bi,j’s for which i ≤ k − 1 and j = ℓ. Therefore, the
bk,ℓ’s can be computed in the following order via the recurrence: for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . and for k = 0, . . . , n,
compute bk,n−k. We now make a conjecture on the bk,ℓ’s:
Conjecture 6.5. Let B(x, P ) =∑∞k=0∑∞ℓ=0 (bk,ℓ · xk · P ℓ) . Then,
(i) the series B(x, P ) converges for 0 ≤ x < 12 , x ≤ P ≤ 12 ,
(ii) B(x, P ) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ x < 12 , x ≤ P ≤ 12 , and
(iii) ∫ P0 B(x, P ) dx = 1P+1 −√1−2P1+2P , for 0 ≤ P ≤ 12 .
Comments on Conjecture 6.5. We now make some comments on the conjecture, indicating some possible
approaches to settle it.
(i) Numerical approximations indicate that B(x, P ) converges for each 0 ≤ x < 12 , x ≤ P ≤ 12 , but it
diverges for x = P = 12 .
(ii) For k ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, let
ak,ℓ =
ℓ∑
i=0
((
k + 2
i
)
· bk,ℓ−i
)
,
also, let
B1(x, P ) =
∞∑
k=0
(∑k
ℓ=0
(
ak,ℓ · P ℓ
)
(P + 1)k+2
· xk
)
.
By looking at the first few terms ofB1(x, P )’s Taylor expansion, it appears thatB(x, P ) = B1(x, P ).
The B1(x, P ) expression, ifB1(x, P ) = B(x, P ), could be quite useful to prove non-negativity, since
the ak,ℓ’s seem all to be non-negative — if they are point (ii) of the conjecture directly follows.
Also, ifB1(x, P ) = B(x, P ), then one can express bk,ℓ (for each ℓ ≥ 0) in terms of bk,0, bk,1, . . . , bk,k:
bk,ℓ =
k∑
i=0

bk,i ·
min(k,ℓ)∑
j=i
(
(−1)ℓ−j
(ℓ− j)! ·
(
k + 2
j − i
)
·
ℓ−j∑
h=0
([
ℓ− j
h
]
· (k + 2)h
)) ,
where
[n
k
]
represents the unsigned Stirling number of the first kind with indices n ≥ k. The last claim
can be proved using the B1(x, P ) expression and the following expression for (Q+ 1)−t, t > 0:
1
(Q+ 1)t
=
∞∑
i=0

(−1)i
i!
·
i∑
j=0
([
i
j
]
· tj
)
·Qi

 .
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bk,ℓ ℓ = 0 ℓ = 1 ℓ = 2 ℓ = 3 ℓ = 4 ℓ = 5
k = 0 1 −2 3 −4 5 −6
k = 1 2 −2 0 4 −10 18
k = 2 3 −8 18 −36 65 −108
k = 3 203 −443 20 −443 −403 80
k = 4 253 −643 53 −3883 8803 −610
k = 5 985 −84415 5825 −188 6683 −5585
Table 1: The first few bk,ℓ’s.
ak,ℓ ℓ = 0 ℓ = 1 ℓ = 2 ℓ = 3 ℓ = 4 ℓ = 5
k = 0 1
k = 1 2 4
k = 2 3 4 4
k = 3 203
56
3
40
3
16
3
k = 4 253
86
3 50
106
3
32
3
k = 5 985
1214
15
2012
15
656
5
1016
15
46
3
Table 2: The first few ak,ℓ’s.
(iii) Since
1
P + 1
−
√
1− 2P
1 + 2P
=
∞∑
n=0
(Cn · Pn) ,
with
Cn =
{
1− (2⌊n/2⌋
⌊n/2⌋
)
if n is even
2
(2⌊n/2⌋
⌊n/2⌋
)− 1 if n is odd = 1− 3 · (−1)
n
2
·
(
2 ⌊n/2⌋
⌊n/2⌋
)
+ (−1)n,
we have that the point (iii) of the conjecture states that, for n ≥ 0,
n∑
k=0
bk,n−k
k + 1
= Cn+1.
Tables 1 and 2 show how the bk,ℓ and the ak,ℓ sequences begins.
We use Conjecture 6.5 to show the existence of a probability distribution over permutations that induces
a given set of “marginals”.
Lemma 6.6. Let 0 ≤ p1 < p2 < · · · < pn ≤ 1. Then, if Conjecture 6.5 is true, there exists a probability
distribution over the symmetric group Sn, such that, for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
Πi,j = Pr
π
[π(i) < π(j)] = min
(
1,
1
pi + pj
)
.
Proof. To each probability p ∈ [0, 1] we associate a random variable Xp with values:
• if p ≤ 12 , Xp is the constant random variable p, with a point mass γp = 1 at p;
30
• if p > 12 , Xp has a point mass of 0 ≤ γp ≤ 1 at p; Xp has a density function fp(x), with fp(x) =
αp(x) for x ∈
[
1− p, 12
]
and fp(x) = βp(x) for x ∈
(
1
2 , p
)
, with
αp(x) = (p+ x)
−2,
βp(x) = B
(
x− 1
2
, p − 1
2
)
,
and
γp =
√
1
p
− 1.
By Conjecture 6.5, we have that βp(x) ≥ 0 and
∫ p
1/2 βp(x) dx =
2
2p+1 −
√
1
p − 1; therefore the total
probability mass assigned to Xp is 1 — Xp is then a well-defined random variable.
The CDF associated to αp(x), for p ≥ 12 and 1− p ≤ y ≤ 12 is:∫ y
1−p
αp(x)dx =
y − 1 + p
y + p
.
The CDF associated to βp(x), for p ≥ 12 and 12 ≤ y ≤ p is:∫ y
1
2
βp(x)dx =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
ℓ=0
(
bk,ℓ
k + 1
·
(
y − 1
2
)k+1
·
(
p− 1
2
)ℓ)
Observe that if p 6= q, then there’s zero probability that Xp = Xq — since, for each p, Xp has a positive
point mass only at p. Then, we pick a permutation π of {1, 2, . . . , n} by letting π(i) < π(j) iff Xpi < Xpj .
We verify that the marginals Πi,j of our distribution satisfy the requirement in the claim:
• if 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1− p, then:
Pr [Xp ≤ Xq] = 1
• if 0 ≤ p < 12 and 1− p ≤ q ≤ 1, then:
Pr [Xp ≤ Xq] = Pr [Xq ≥ p] = 1−
∫ p
1−q
(q + x)−2 dx =
1
p+ q
.
• if 12 < p < q ≤ 1. Let P1 = Pr
[
Xp ≤ Xq ≤ 12
]
, P2 = Pr
[
Xp ≤ 12 ≤ Xq
]
, P3 = Pr
[
1
2 ≤ Xp ≤ p ≤ Xq
]
,
and P4 = Pr
[
1
2 ≤ Xp ≤ Xq < p
]
. Then,
Pr [Xp ≤ Xq] = P1 + P2 + P3 + P4.
We now show that P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 = 1p+q , completing the proof. We start by computing P1 and P2:
P1 =
∫ 1
2
1−p
(
(q + x)−2 ·
∫ x
1−p
(p + y)−2dy
)
dx =
∫ 1
2
1−p
x− (1− p)
(q + x)2(p + x)
dx
=
2p− 1
(q − p)(2q + 1) −
ln (2p+1)(1−p+q)2q+1
(q − p)2 .
31
P2 =
∫ 1
2
1−p
(p+ x)−2dx ·
(
1−
∫ 1
2
1−q
(q + x)−2dx
)
=
2p − 1
2p + 1
·
(
1− 2q − 1
2q + 1
)
=
2p− 1
2p+ 1
· 2
2q + 1
.
As for P3 and P4, we have:
P3 =
(∫ p
1
2
βp(x)dx+
√
1
p
− 1
)
·
(∫ q
p
βq(x)dx+
√
1
q
− 1
)
=
2
2p + 1
·
(
2
2q + 1
−
∫ p
1
2
βq(x)dx
)
.
P4 =
∫ p
1
2
(
βq(x) ·
∫ x
1
2
βp(y)dy
)
dx
We show that for our definition of B(x, P ) = βP+1/2 (x+ 1/2), the equation Pr [Xp ≤ Xq] = P1 +
P2 + P3 + P4 is equal to P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 = 1p+q , for each
1
2 < p < q ≤ 1.
The latter is true iff P3 + P4 = 1p+q − P1 − P2; expanding the terms, we get the equation holds iff:
2
2p+ 1
·
(
2
2q + 1
−
∫ p
1
2
βq(x)dx
)
+
∫ p
1
2
(
βq(x) ·
∫ x
1
2
βp(y)dy
)
dx =
1
p+ q
− 2p− 1
(q − p)(2q + 1) +
ln (q−p+1)(2p+1)2q+1
(q − p)2 −
2p− 1
2p+ 1
· 2
2q + 1
,
or, equivalently, ∫ p
1
2
(
βq(x) ·
∫ x
1
2
βp(y)dy
)
dx− 2
2p+ 1
·
∫ p
1
2
βq(x)dx =
1
p+ q
+
ln (q−p+1)(2p+1)2q+1
(q − p)2 −
2q − 1
(q − p)(2q + 1) .
For notational convenience, we let P = p− 12 and Q = q− 12 . Let B(P,Q) = βq(p) = βQ+ 12 (P +
1
2). We
thus need to prove: ∫ P
0
(
B(x,Q) ·
∫ x
0
B(y, P )dy
)
dx− 1
P + 1
·
∫ P
0
B(x,Q)dx =
1
P +Q+ 1
+
ln (Q−P+1)(P+1)Q+1
(Q− P )2 −
Q
(Q+ 1)(Q − P ) . (7)
Since we will expand the right-hand side in a Taylor series around (Q,P ) = (0, 0), we observe that the
right-hand side has a removable singularity at P = Q. Indeed, letting P = Q− ǫ,
lim
ǫ→0

 ln (1+ǫ)(Q+1−ǫ)Q+1
ǫ2
− Q
(Q+ 1)ǫ

 = lim
ǫ→0

 ln
(
(1 + ǫ)
(
1− ǫQ+1
))
ǫ2
− Q
(Q+ 1)ǫ


= lim
ǫ→0

ǫ− ǫQ+1 − ǫ2Q+1 − Q2ǫ22(Q+1)2 +O(ǫ3)
ǫ2
− Q
(Q+ 1)ǫ


= lim
ǫ→0
− ǫ2Q+1 − Q
2ǫ2
2(Q+1)2 +O(ǫ
3)
ǫ2
= − 1
Q+ 1
− Q
2
2(Q+ 1)2
,
32
since the limit from the left and the right coincide. Therefore, if P = Q, the right-hand side of Equation 7 is
1
2Q+ 1
− 1
Q+ 1
− Q
2
2(Q+ 1)2
.
Recalling that
B(P,Q) =
∞∑
ℓ=0
∞∑
k=0
(
bk,ℓ · P k ·Qℓ
)
,
we get that the following holds:
∫ P
0
(
B(x,Q) ·
∫ x
0
B(y, P )dy
)
dx =
∞∑
ℓ=0
∞∑
k=2



 ∑
i,j≥0
i+j≤k−2
bi,k−2−i−j · bj,ℓ
(i+ 1)(i + j + 2)

 · P k ·Qℓ


=
∞∑
ℓ=0
∞∑
k=2
(
xk−2,ℓ · P k ·Qℓ
)
.
Also, ∫ P
0
B(x,Q)dx =
∞∑
ℓ=0
∞∑
k=1
(
bk−1,ℓ
k
· P k ·Qℓ
)
,
and, since 1P+1 =
∑∞
k=0
(
(−1)k · P k),
− 1
P + 1
·
∫ P
0
B(x,Q)dx = −
∞∑
ℓ=0
∞∑
k=1
[
k−1∑
i=0
(
(−1)k−1−i · bi,ℓ
i+ 1
)
· P k ·Qℓ
]
= −
∞∑
ℓ=0
∞∑
k=1
(
yk−1,ℓ · P k ·Qℓ
)
.
Furthermore, we have
1
P +Q+ 1
=
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
ℓ=0
c1(k, ℓ) · P k ·Qℓ
ln (Q−P+1)(P+1)Q+1
(Q− P )2 −
Q
(Q+ 1)(Q − P ) =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
ℓ=0
c2(k, ℓ) · P k ·Qℓ
with
c1(k, ℓ) = (−1)k+ℓ ·
(
k + ℓ
k
)
,
c2(k, ℓ) = −
(−1)ℓ · (k+ℓk )+ (−1)k+ℓ · (ℓ+ 1)
k + ℓ+ 2
.
observe that ck,ℓ = c1(k, ℓ) + c2(k, ℓ), where ck,ℓ is as in Definition 6.4.
We then have that P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 = 1p+q (particularly, Equation 7) is satisfied iff
∞∑
ℓ=0
∞∑
k=0
(
(xk−2,ℓ − yk−1,ℓ) · P k ·Qℓ
)
=
∞∑
ℓ=0
∞∑
k=0
(
ck,ℓ · P k ·Qℓ
)
.
The equality holds iff for each k, ℓ ≥ 0, we have
ck,ℓ = xk−2,ℓ − yk−1,ℓ.
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Observe that if k = 0, then the equation is satisfied, since c0,ℓ = x−2,ℓ = y−1,ℓ = 0. If k ≥ 1, then
yk−1,ℓ =
bk−1,ℓ
k − yk−2,ℓ. Since we defined the bk,ℓ’s to be, for for each k, ℓ ≥ 0,
bk,ℓ = (k + 1) · (xk−1,ℓ + yk−1,ℓ − ck+1,ℓ) ,
we have that Equation 7 is satisfied and P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 = 1p+q .
Using the previous distribution over permutations we can prove the main theorem of the section.
Theorem 6.7. Let 0 ≤ p1 < p2 < · · · < pn ≤ 1 be the blue-probabilities of a set of bichromatic urns.
Let ǫ = min1≤i≤n−1(pi+1 − pi). If Conjecture 6.5 is true, there exists a symmetric voting scheme for the
Condorcet election that guarantees that the unknown urn wins with probability 1−η with O
(
ln η−1
ǫ2
)
voters.
Proof. Lemma 6.6 guarantees the existence of a probability distribution P over the set of permutations of
{1, 2, . . . , n} such that, for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, Prπ∼P [π(i) < π(j)] = min
(
1, 1pi+pj
)
. If π(j) > π(i)
we say that j beats i in π.
We also let qi = 1 − pi; therefore 0 ≤ qn < qn−1 < · · · < q1 ≤ 1, and min1≤i≤n−1(qi+1 − qi) = ǫ.
Lemma 6.6 again guarantees the existence of a probability distribution Q over the set of permutations of
{1, 2, . . . , n} such that for n ≥ i > j ≥ 1, we have Prπ∼Q[π(i) < π(j)] = min
(
1, 1qi+qj
)
.
Each voter will apply the following algorithm: if she draws blue, she sample a permutation according to
P , otherwise she samples a permutation according to Q.
Now, suppose the i-th urn is the unknown urn. Let j 6= i be the index of any other urn. If j > i,
Pr[the unknown urn i beats another urn j] = pi Pr
π∼P
[π(i) > π(j)] + (1− pi) Pr
π∼Q
[π(i) > π(j)]
= pimax
(
0, 1 − 1
pi + pj
)
+ qimin
(
1,
1
qi + qj
)
,
if pi + pj ≤ 1 (and therefore qi + qj ≥ 1) the latter simplifies to qiqi+qj ; otherwise pi + pj > 1, qi + qj < 1,
and the expression simplifies to pi
(
1− 1pi+pj
)
+ qi = pi − pipi+pj + 1− pi = 1−
pi
pi+pj
=
pj
pi+pj
.
Therefore, if j > i, we have
Pr[the unknown urn i beats another urn j] ∈
{
qi
qi + qj
,
pj
pi + pj
}
.
If, otherwise, j < i, we have
Pr[the unknown urn i beats another urn j] = pi Pr
π∼P
[π(i) > π(j)] + (1− pi) Pr
π∼Q
[π(i) > π(j)]
= pimin
(
1,
1
pi + pj
)
+ qimax
(
0, 1− 1
qi + qj
)
,
if qi + qj ≤ 1 (and therefore pi + pj ≥ 1) the latter simplifies to pipi+pj ; otherwise qi + qj > 1, pi + pj < 1,
and the expression simplifies to pi + qi
(
1− 1qi+qj
)
= 1− qi + qi − qiqi+qj =
qj
qi+qj
.
Therefore, in any case, Pr[the unknown urn i beats another urn j] ∈
{
max(qi,qj)
qi+qj
,
max(pi,pj)
pi+pj
}
. We lower-
bound the latter two fractions:
max(pi, pj)
pi + pj
=
max(pi, pj)
2max(pi, pj)− |pi − pj| =
max(pi, pj)− 12 |pi − pj|
2max(pi, pj)− |pi − pj| +
1
2
· |pi − pj|
2max(pi, pj)− |pi − pj|
=
1
2
·
(
1 +
|pi − pj|
pi + pj
)
≥ 1
2
+
|pi − pj |
4
,
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and, analogously,
max(qi, qj)
qi + qj
≥ 1
2
+
|qi − qj|
4
.
Since, |qi − qj| = |pi − pj|, we have
Pr[the unknown urn i beats another urn j] ≥ 1
2
+
|pi − pj|
4
≥ 1
2
+
|i− j|
4
· ǫ.
Now, given two urns i, j, let Xi(j) be the random variable counting the number of votes in which i > j,
with m voters. Observe that if Xi(j) > m2 , then urn i beats urn j. Also,
m
2
≤ m ·
(
1
2
+
|i− j| · ǫ
4
)
≤ E[Xi(j)] ≤ m,
and
Pr
[
|Xi(j) − E[Xi(j)]| ≥ |i− j| · ǫ
5
·m
]
≤ Pr
[
|Xi(j) −E[Xi(j)]| ≥ |i− j| · ǫ
5
·E[Xi(j)]
]
≤ exp
(
−|i− j|
2 · ǫ2
75
·E[Xi(j)]
)
≤ exp
(
−|i− j|
2 · ǫ2
150
·m
)
.
By choosing m =
⌈
150ǫ−2 ln 3η
⌉
, we obtain:
Pr
[
|Xi(j) − E[Xi(j)]| ≥ |i− j| · ǫ
5
·m
]
≤ exp
(
− |i− j|2 ln 3
η
)
=
(η
3
)|i−j|2
≤
(η
3
)|i−j|
.
Observe that if |Xi(j)− E[Xi(j)]| < |i−j|·ǫ5 ·m, then — by E[Xi(j)] ≥ m ·
(
1
2 +
|i−j|ǫ
4
)
— we get
Xi(j) ≥ m ·
(
1
2 +
|i−j|ǫ
20
)
> m2 , which implies that urn i beats urn j.
Applying the Union Bound over all the urns j 6= i, we obtain
Pr[urn i does not win the election] ≤ 2 ·
∞∑
k=1
(η
3
)k
= 2 ·
η/3
1− η/3 ≤ η.
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